Evidence of meeting #43 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was asia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
7:50 p.m.
Associate Professor, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
I think, certainly, the Southeast Asian position is that dialogue is critical, and I think, for the Canadian side, open channels of dialogue are valuable.
7:50 p.m.
Prof. Alice Ba
I will simply echo the same.
7:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Mr. Fragiskatos.
We will go to Monsieur Bergeron.
For everybody online, make sure you have the French selected, unless you understand French well, because Mr. Bergeron speaks French very well, and he's about to ask you some questions for the next six minutes.
7:50 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us this evening and for enlightening us on this subject. I have a series of questions for Professor Ba.
In an article published in International Affairs in May 2023, you wrote that one of the most important issues for ASEAN could be the escalating conflict in Myanmar.
Specifically, you were saying that there are growing legitimacy issues within ASEAN as a result of developments in Myanmar. On May 24, a number of countries, including Canada, the United States, some European Union countries and the European Union itself, the United Kingdom and South Korea, issued a statement on the situation in Myanmar.
What legitimacy problems do you see with the escalation of the conflict in Myanmar within ASEAN? What impact might that have on the way forward?
7:50 p.m.
Prof. Alice Ba
Myanmar is one of the most important current challenges facing ASEAN as an institution. There are two challenges, as I see it.
One is internal, in the sense that among member states there are differences in terms of how much to engage the regime, for example. There is some unhappiness about the Myanmar regime in terms of its responsiveness and its ability to uphold past commitments with ASEAN, for example. The first legitimation challenge is internal, in the sense that ASEAN unity is important.
Second, I think that the Myanmar challenge is an external legitimation problem, in the sense that, as I think the question itself suggests, others look at ASEAN and see an organization that hasn't been able to effectively contain the problem or solve the problem.
This said, I want to emphasize why, for example, ASEAN continues as an organization, despite its differences, to maintain channels of communication with Myanmar. It has not completely cut off Myanmar by any means, actually. That is because there's a strong belief that if you leave a Southeast Asian state by itself, it will be all the more vulnerable to being manipulated and dominated by other actors.
ASEAN remains an important organization that helps to carve out options and pathways forward for challenged states.
7:50 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
The Indo‑Pacific strategies of Canada and the United States emphasize the central role of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. However, in November 2023, on the United States Institute of Peace website, you said that the United States perceived a lack of interest in Southeast Asian countries seeking to engage with them economically and diplomatically.
How can we reconcile this idea that, in the context of the American Indo‑Pacific strategy, ASEAN would play a central role and the lack of interest you perceived on the part of the United States in ASEAN?
7:50 p.m.
Prof. Alice Ba
I disagree with some U.S. policies. The Biden administration, in some ways, although not a complete continuation, certainly draws certain lessons and experiences from the Obama administration.
There has been some kind of downgrading, I would argue, in the United States engagement with ASEAN, despite its references to and support of ASEAN centrality. Its references to ASEAN centrality, again, get at one of the points I mentioned in my remarks, which is that most states, including the United States, are aware that ASEAN remains an important legitimating factor for other states. ASEAN may have its own legitimation problems, but so do its partners, so supporting ASEAN centrality is an important part of that.
Also, a point I wanted to make in my earlier remarks is that all states that have some interest in the region have a stake in ASEAN. The reason is that in the absence of ASEAN, you would have much more vulnerable individual states; you would have a more divided region, and you would have a much more unstable Southeast Asia.
7:55 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you.
I'll come back to the American Indo‑Pacific strategy, which wants to contribute to a unified ASEAN.
Professor Ba, you and the other witnesses have pointed out how ASEAN, despite its differences with China, for example, seeks to remain united despite the pressures in the South China Sea.
My question is very simple. Could ASEAN survive a power grab by China in the South China Sea?
My question is for Professor Ba first, and then perhaps Mr. Stephens.
7:55 p.m.
Prof. Alice Ba
The issue of ASEAN's survival has plagued it since its founding. The main thing to understand about ASEAN is that its first and foremost priority is its intraregional relations. ASEAN will remain relevant for that reason in terms of providing mechanisms for members to work with one another, so that will be its first priority.
Its second priority is these other issues we've been highlighting.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
7:55 p.m.
Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, As an Individual
I, too, am convinced that ASEAN can survive in spite of China. I think the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, is a very good example. It's based on the central role of ASEAN, but it includes China, South Korea, Japan, and so on. It's a way of bringing ASEAN into a central role and building relationships with China.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.
Ms. McPherson, the next six minutes are yours.
June 3rd, 2024 / 7:55 p.m.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all of the witnesses for being with us today and sharing this information.
One thing that stayed in my mind as I was listening to the testimony was in regard to the role China plays in the region. Obviously, the Indo-Pacific strategy was put in place to help Canada diversify its dependence on China. We are hearing about how, for example, with the CPTPP—Mr. Kmiec, I'm having the same problem as you—China would like to block Taiwan from joining. That said, obviously China is not a member, but members would be deeply influenced by China. We saw this at the United Nations Human Rights Council. The power China has is not necessarily overt, but rather subliminal.
Would this not be a real concern we might have within multiple frameworks? The CPTPP would be one, as is developing relationships with others, because of the pressure China puts on those countries. They depend on China more than they depend on us. I'm curious about that.
I'll go to all three of you.
I am also curious, as you're answering that, about one of the other comments I found interesting: that Canada has a strength because we are not the U.S. or China. However, are we not seen as a very close ally of the United States? Does that not impact some of the decisions being made within the region?
Maybe I'll start with you, Mr. Ostwald.
7:55 p.m.
Associate Professor, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
Thank you.
I'll say, firstly, that China does have the capacity to influence countries in Southeast Asia. It does that on a regular basis. It's not the only country that tries to leverage others, but it does so very effectively. There's a particular example that's frequently raised: The 2012 ASEAN summit had discussions on the South China Sea. The assumption was that ASEAN failed to come up with a statement because of pressures from China. That is a concern.
Maybe I'll pass this to the others and come back.
7:55 p.m.
Prof. Alice Ba
I'm going to make three points.
The first is this: I want to give a somewhat different characterization of China's interest in the CPTPP. In my view, China's interest in the CPTPP has more to do with its concern that, if the United States should come to a position where it joins again, China will be cut out. From China's standpoint, I think it's important that it join before this happens. If it were to join before Taiwan, I think Mr. Stephens' point is correct. It would have greater influence in a consensus organization. Establishing and clarifying what the rules of ascension are would be very important. In that sense, it is about making decisions in terms of the six states that have applied to join.
The second question is in terms of the other ASEAN states. As was noted, only three ASEAN states are part of the CPTPP. Not all states are equipped to join the CPTPP. One of the important reasons for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership was that the original TPP—and now the CPTPP—made it very challenging for the least developed members of ASEAN to participate. Again, for Southeast Asian members of ASEAN, it is important not to leave a member behind.
The third question you asked is also a good one. Canada is a close partner and ally of the United States. Would that not taint Canada by association? I don't think it would, necessarily. It depends on how you do it. Japan is actually the model. It is extremely close to the United States. Those who have been studying Japanese foreign policy know, for example, that Japan has been extremely influential in terms of some of the specific content of the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, if you look at different assessments of Japan and Southeast Asia, Japan is among the most trusted external powers. That's partly because Japan listens to Southeast Asian states. Therefore, the content it's also conveying in terms of how it has influenced some of the direction in getting greater Southeast Asian buy-in is trying to inject some of those things it's hearing from the region. Canada could do that, too. I don't think it necessarily means you're tainted by association.
8 p.m.
Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, As an Individual
In terms of China's influence on the existing members of the new TPP, certainly it has a greater influence over some than others. I'm not talking exclusively about the ASEAN countries either. I'll single out one country: Chile. Chile has very close relations with China because of a bilateral trade agreement with China.
That is a problem. I think ultimately we don't know for sure what China's motivations are. They probably do not include reforming the state-owned enterprise. Perhaps they're trying to shift the CPTPP, or maybe they're trying to make life difficult for Taiwan, but I don't think we're going to know until we move ahead with the accession process. In a way, I think it's almost fair to say that China's bluff needs to be called. They need to be invited to take part in the accession process. As with Taiwan, let's deal with these on their own merits. It's not an insurmountable obstacle.
There is a supposedly insurmountable obstacle, which is the USMCA, which has this poison pill that makes it very difficult for Canada to sign a free trade agreement with China. We can talk about that another time.
That also brings us to the question you asked about the U.S. I agree with Ms. Ba that Japan has been able to play this game well. However, Japan, of course, is not Canada. Canada has a different dynamic with the United States, similar in some ways to Japan's, but also different in other ways, such as in terms of economic dependency. Yes, it is an issue. I think we have to be extremely careful not to be seen as what at one time was called the deputy sheriff of the U.S., a label that was put on Australia. We need to play in our own interests, but we have to be realistic.
Canada's room for manoeuvring is relatively limited. We need to find that area in which we can make a positive contribution and develop our own relations with ASEAN based on the values that we have. I made the point about why it is Canada. It has to do with our values. It has to do with our opportunities for clean energy exchanges and so forth. We need to make the case that we're not just a little brother to the United States. We happen to be in North America, but we also have something unique to offer.
8 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Mr. Stephens.
For our next round, we'll go to Mr. Chong for five minutes.
8 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Thank you
I've been listening to the testimony here. Japan was mentioned just a few moments ago as being an effective partner in ASEAN and as being respected amongst ASEAN nations.
I'd be interested in hearing your perspective on how Australia's role in the region has been perceived. What in Australia's approach has been effective, and what has been less effective?
Perhaps all three of you could comment on that. I ask that in the context of Canada's being a member of the Commonwealth, a parliamentary democracy similar in size to Australia economically and in terms of population. That's the context in which I ask this question.
8:05 p.m.
Associate Professor, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
I can start with the positive. I think Australia is seen as a highly engaged partner to Southeast Asia. There are a lot of people-to-people ties, as well as economic ones. In that sense, Australia punches above its weight, given its population size, in terms of being influential in the region.
It also has long-standing ties. Much as is the case with Japan, there is a sense that its diplomatic corps understands Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia's interests.
I'll add that Southeast Asia has been somewhat controversial in the last several years. Australia is part of AUKUS, of course. AUKUS was met with some hesitation in Southeast Asia. I'll say more broadly that there is wide interest in balancing China in Southeast Asia, but there is concern when that begins to look like militarizing the region as a venue for playing out great power competition. I think some nations saw AUKUS as being too close to militarizing the region. Australia got some push-back for that.
8:05 p.m.
Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, As an Individual
Australia and Canada clearly have a lot of historical commonalities. With respect to Southeast Asia, the obvious difference comes from the geographical proximity of Australia, which I think has led to a much more consistent engagement by Australia. After all, Indonesia is Australia's neighbour. As you know, it's right on its doorstep.
The relationship has not always been that smooth. Relations between some of the ASEAN countries and Australia have been fraught. I think they're considerably better now. Australia has a huge investment because of its geographical proximity.
The other factor is the security issue. Australia's defence relationship with the U.S. is different from Canada's. It has led to this AUKUS arrangement with the U.S. and the U.K. That has not been particularly well received by ASEAN. On the other hand, one could perhaps see from an Australian strategic perspective that they feel kind of isolated and alone, and maybe this kind of an arrangement is necessary for them. It may not be as necessary in the same way for Canada.
8:05 p.m.
Prof. Alice Ba
I'll just say some of the same things that my colleagues have already said.
I do think that the AUKUS question has been an important one in terms of the concerns about militarization and also what that means in terms of Australia's proximity to the United States.
This said, the critical difference between Australia and Canada is geographical proximity, as Mr. Stephens just said. I think that economics is also quite important for Australia. You can see Australia also trying to figure that balance out, I think. This doesn't quite answer your question, but I do think you can see this negotiation within Australia itself, and you can see that in some of its recent remarks as well.
8:05 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Perhaps you could elaborate a bit on what you mentioned earlier with respect to Japan and how they are a very trusted partner in the region. Maybe you could elaborate a bit on what they have done in order to become that very trusted partner in the region, while at the same time hosting U.S. military bases, being a very close ally to the United States. Maybe you could talk to us a bit about how they have accomplished that.
