Thank you very much. It's indeed my privilege to be here before the committee to talk about a critical issue.
The first point I would like to leave with the committee is the fact that we are heading into a new security environment in which air power is going to be increasingly important. We are leaving behind the type of environment in which we were able to have us operate in areas of air superiority. We will probably be fighting with enemies that match us or in fact have superiority. That, then, makes it implicit that we have a procurement policy and a capability that go beyond just simply providing the forces with the capabilities they need; they also must have the capability of being able to replace that capability, as it probably will be facing losses going into the future.
The second point I would like to introduce into our considerations is the fact of understanding the overall procurement policies of Canada. We have at least two major pathologies that we have not yet been able to deal with.
The first pathology relates to the lack of information. There is so much of the process that is closed to outside observation, of course, that it's very difficult for us to make intelligent observations and corrections in terms of any types of difficulties in it. There are lifelong exclusions from sharing of information, and this makes a critical evaluation or an ability to compare to what our allies do very difficult for the outside observer.
The second point is that our air procurement process is dominated by political decisions. As we have seen from the issues surrounding the Sea Kings, the F-35s and the C-17s, the involvement of the Prime Minister and his highest level of governance to influence the overall determination of these decisions ultimately is, for many outside observers, the major determinant of whether or not a project is done fast, as was the case of the C-17s, or is done agonizingly slowly, as we saw with the example of the Sea Kings.
I would end my comments by just observing that the period in which we had the luxury of basically having an air capability that we bought in 1982, and then not thinking about it in serious methods until 2022, is over. We will need to think nimbly, we will need to be thinking fast and we will be needing to think in terms of the greater international security environment.
Thank you.