Indigenous and Northern Affairs Committee on May 17th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

I open this Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development of Thursday, May 17, 2007.

Committee members, you have the orders of the day before you. We're continuing our study on Bill C-44, an act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Appearing today, from Cornet Consulting and Mediation Inc., we have Wendy Cornet. Welcome. And from the University of Winnipeg we have Larry Chartrand, director, aboriginal governance program. Welcome.

We'll be asking the witnesses to make submissions of ten minutes, or roughly that amount of time, and then we'll move into questions.

Madame Cornet, would you like to speak first?

[Wendy Cornet, Cornet Consulting and Mediation Inc.]

Sure.

Good morning, and thank you for inviting me to be with you here today.

I am a principal in the firm Cornet Consulting and Mediation Inc. I'll give you a bit of background about myself. I've worked in the area of aboriginal affairs policy since 1976, since before going to law school. I worked with the research branch of the Library of Parliament for a period of time, and since leaving the branch I've worked as a consultant, working with both the federal government and various aboriginal organizations at the national, regional, and community levels.

The first issue I was going to address was the challenge of consultation. In this regard, it's important to consider the respective roles of the executive on the one hand and Parliament on the other in ensuring compliance with section 35 of the Constitution Act.

The executive branch is responsible for directing consultation activities, although it is also possible that legislation could be passed to provide direction on this subject. It is the legislative branch that ultimately has the power to affect the enjoyment of aboriginal and treaty rights, and therefore has the responsibility to consider them in adopting legislation. Where the legislative branch does not meet this obligation, the judicial branch may provide a remedy to uphold the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution.

While we understand the executive and legislative branches have distinct roles, there is a relationship between them. As Peter Hogg has noted in his book Constitutional Law of Canada, even a minority government is able to exercise substantial control over the legislative process. An example would be the government's discretion to table and withdraw a government bill, for example.

Section 35 of the Constitution Act is the supreme law of the land in the same way the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is, meaning that the final product of the legislative process, a bill adopted into law, must comply with the requirements of section 35. Where legal duty to consult does exist, properly fulfilling this duty can be part of determining whether there has been an unjustifiable infringement of aboriginal and treaty rights.

The executive has the primary responsibility for identifying any legal duty to consult and ensuring it is met. The legislative branch is therefore dependent on the executive for carrying out this duty adequately but in the end holds the decision-making power about whether to pass a given piece of legislation. Compliance with section 35 necessarily requires a capacity on the part of the crown to answer several legal questions correctly prior to the adoption of a bill into law where there is a legal duty to consult and to make a reasonable effort to accommodate the perspectives of aboriginal peoples.

The government must first accurately answer the question of whether there is an aboriginal or treaty right that could be at risk, or a potential aboriginal treaty right that could be at risk of infringement, and thereby give rise to a duty to consult. Where the government answers that question correctly and proceeds to carry out a consultation exercise, that consultation, in its scope and content, must also be sufficient to meet the requirements of section 35. This again requires legal analysis, one that is dependent on getting the first question correct about the existing scope and content of aboriginal treaty rights. This is because the scope and content of an aboriginal right can affect the scope and content of the duty to consult. Likewise, the strength of a claim to a potential aboriginal and treaty right can also affect the scope and content of the duty to consult.

Where the government does carry out consultation, it then must come to the correct answer on whether the legislation being contemplated requires any adjustment or modification as a result of anything the crown has learned during a consultation process. The penultimate challenge for the crown is to answer all of these legal questions correctly and to carry out any legal duty to consult adequately prior to the adoption of a bill.

However, by its nature, a bill can be changed at various points in its consideration by Parliament prior to its adoption, and so too may its impact on aboriginal and treaty rights. This suggests that the obligation to ensure that a bill does not result in an infringement--and specifically an unjustifiable infringement--of aboriginal and treaty rights ultimately rests with Parliament as a whole. Parliament, of course, may rely on the advice of parliamentary committees and what it hears in debate.

In addition, Parliament could perhaps rely on some form of certification respecting section 35 analysis provided by the Department of Justice respecting a bill tabled by government. Such a process currently exists with respect to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms but does not exist.... I'm just outlining a possibility that could take place but doesn't at the moment, as far as I know.

Concerning consultation carried out prior to a bill's tabling, a question arises about how the potential for infringement can be discussed among aboriginal peoples in Canada in a consultation process where the details of the government's proposal to legislate are not revealed to the aboriginal peoples concerned until a bill is tabled. This may raise the question whether in a particular case there has been adequate consultation, sufficient for aboriginal peoples to assess the potential for infringement with representatives of the crown and to engage with the crown in a process aimed at reconciliation of aboriginal treaty rights with crown sovereignty.

To conduct an adequate assessment of the potential existence of an aboriginal treaty right and the potential risk of infringement, if any, there are two vital areas of information. The first area involves the details of the proposed legislative activity. While the executive cannot trench on the legislative process, it does have the power, through a decision of cabinet, to share details of the bill with the aboriginal peoples concerned prior to its introduction to Parliament.

The other vital area of information is one where the government and aboriginal peoples may both have some information or knowledge on the existence or potential existence of an aboriginal treaty right. In this regard it helps to remember that the Supreme Court of Canada has said the perspectives of aboriginal peoples are to be taken into account in making an assessment on these questions. All this points out how vitally important it is that consultation processes involve a thorough two-way sharing of information and perspectives to ensure an accurate and informed assessment of the risk of infringement.

I was going to say a few words about consultation process design and conflict management and point out that Indian Act reform has historically displayed the dynamics and characteristics of what has sometimes been called intractable conflicts, meaning the underlying issues to conflict are deep-rooted, multi-generational, and involve issues of power inequality, identity, and high stakes distribution.

Interactions between first nations and federal and provincial governments have been characterized by power imbalance, mistrust, and repeated negative patterns. And while there's a fair amount of literature studying the outcomes of litigation, there is a surprisingly small amount of literature studying negotiation processes involving first nations and governments from a conflict management perspective. There is a small amount of literature looking at the experiences of BCTC or the Indian Claims Commission, but relatively little of this literature has been applied to discussions at the national level, particularly involving the development of legislation at the national level.

Finally, I'll address the issue of section 35 and the interpretive clause. While the Canadian Human Rights Act is a quasi-constitutional statute, section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 has explicit constitutional status as the supreme law of the land. It seems inevitable that issues relating to section 35 will arise in connection with some complaints arising from first nation communities. This has already occurred in cases where the section 65 exemption has been found not to apply.

In the case of Ermineskin Cree Nation and Canada in 2001--and I believe ongoing peaceful litigation is an example of this--it appears as a result of section 50(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act and various case law that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider constitutional questions related to its jurisdiction to hear a complaint before it, including issues relating to the charter and section 35 questions. However, section 96 courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear such matters. In Ermineskin Cree Nation, the issue before the court was whether the Human Rights Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine a constitutional question relating to section 35 rights, and if so, whether the court had concurrent jurisdiction and should exercise its discretion in the case before it to decide the question.

The court in that case determined that the Human Rights Tribunal did have jurisdiction, but because of its lack of expertise in dealing with section 35 rights, the court decided the matter should be decided by a superior court.

This decision is evidence that section 35 issues in relation to the Canadian Human Rights Act may arise and be decided regardless of whether there is an interpretive clause referencing collective rights. For example, issues will likely arise on whether and which statutory collective rights under the Indian Act have constitutional status as aboriginal rights, such as the retention of the collective property interest in reserve lands to the exclusion of those who are not band members.

In this regard the Guerin case suggests that most if not all first nations have an interest in their reserve lands equivalent to or indistinguishable from an aboriginal title interest. Further, the interest of a first nation in their reserve lands is inextricably tied to the critical matter of membership. The exclusion of non-members from reserve lands would likely attract constitutional protection as a result of section 35 of the Constitution Act, and take precedence over any conflicting direction arising from the protections of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

However, the manner in which the Indian Act or first nation membership codes variously establish membership criteria may be less secure on charter grounds or CHRA grounds of discrimination where these rely on arbitrary requirements with a weak connection to the notion of peoples, and rely instead on elements of gender discrimination or strict blood-quantum requirements, to the exclusion of other criteria.

There are procedural and structural issues to consider in considering repeal of section 67. The Ermineskin Cree Nation case suggests that a complainant may have to wait for a superior court to determine a constitutional issue, and if that question is resolved in favour of tribunal jurisdiction, only then would the tribunal have an opportunity to determine the substance of a complaint. This raises the prospect of a lengthy process for some cases arising from first nations communities, regardless of how the issues relating to an interpretive clause or non-derogation clause are resolved.

One way to possibly streamline the processing of complaints that may involve section 35 issues would be to provide the commission with authority to establish panels with expertise in aboriginal rights and human rights to hear matters arising from first nation communities. Appointments could be made in consultation with first nations and aboriginal peoples.

One way of resolving the issue of the interpretive clause would be to add a “for greater certainty” provision as a subsection to follow subsection 50(2). I've proposed the following wording:

For greater certainty, the interpretation and application of this Act shall be in a manner consistent with the constitutionally protected rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.

This wording should be sufficient to ensure a consideration of constitutionally protected collective rights and their relationship to individual rights, and constitute a direction to balance individual and collective rights in a manner consistent with the Constitution Act, 1982.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chartrand.

[Larry Chartrand, Director, Aboriginal Governance Program, University of Winnipeg]

Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to talk a bit about the implications of repealing section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

I have to apologize, as I have a bit of a cold I got from my five-year-old son. And flying last night didn't help much.

There are maybe three things I really want to touch on in addressing a repeal of section 67 of the act. I just want to note, first of all, that I did some work for the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples in 2003 and a couple of reports—which I am not sure this committee is aware of—on the implications of repealing section 67.

What I did in that two-part report was to look at what would happen if section 67 were repealed. I also did a second report called “Past and Future Impacts of Repealing Section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act”. These look into the future, but also look at the past in terms of whether people can bring past actions once the amendment is made.

I didn't have the chance to find out from CAP what the copyright is on those reports, but I am sure they'd be happy to share them with you. If not, I'll send them along, if the committee is interested in seeing a little bit more of a detailed analysis of what the impact might be.

For the purposes of today, though, I want to concentrate on three issues primarily. One is the impact of the amendment in terms of what it would mean in the aboriginal community, in terms of people not getting access to justice.

I think it was around 2002 or 2003—I am not sure precisely—that I obtained some statistics from the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the number of individuals who have been denied access to redress of their discriminatory complaints, because of the existence of section 67. They estimated that about 100 individuals per year—and this is a conservative estimate—are turned away at the doors of the Human Rights Commission because of the existence of section 67.

We all know, however, that the tribunal, the commission, and the courts have interpreted 67 very narrowly. Yet the exception of people getting access to justice is probably larger than the impact of section 67. In the majority of cases, individuals somehow find a way to actually pursue their complaint through the commission, right?

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[Larry Chartrand]

In the majority of cases, they actually find they can do that; so they have really limited the impact of section 67.

But there is still a significant minority of cases where section 67 continues to deny justice. If you multiply the 100 people by the 30 years of this supposed temporary provision of the code, over 3,000 people have actually not received human rights justice since its existence—and that's a very conservative estimate.

It is really important, I think, that this repeal go forward, just to let people have basic redress for discriminatory actions.

That tells you a little bit about the reality of what might happen if the repeal went through. It's not going to have an overwhelming impact, as some of the literature seems to suggest. It's not going to have an insignificant impact, but it's going to have a moderate impact. There will be a number of people who can get access to justice who weren't able to do so before.

This does mean that the commission is going to have to obtain resources to assist with these additional cases. First nations are going to have to have resources to develop the capacity to address and defend their actions. But this is not going to be enormous; at the end of the day, it's not going to have a major impact.

In fact, what's likely to be more significant, of course.... And I am just going to take the liberty here to mention a couple of things about human rights generally.

It's poverty, lack of housing, lack of economic opportunity, mostly in relation to isolated reserve communities, that really creates the environment that allows discriminatory actions to exist. Social science studies have shown the connection between that type of lifestyle and human rights violations.You don't have to be a rocket scientist to realize there is a significant connection there.

If you really want to address human rights in this country, the Kelowna Accord would have made a bit of an impact. That's where you have to get at human rights issues, in aboriginal communities. You have to raise the communities up to the economic sustainability that they deserve as founding nations in this country. So we can't allow the conditions to continue to exist, the third world conditions.

We have international agencies, like the child international agency, going to do investigations in Canada, the first time ever an international agency goes into Canada to investigate conditions that are like those in third world countries.

I teach students in the University of Manitoba in my aboriginal politics in Manitoba class. They come from some of those isolated reserves and they do community profiles. They show the pictures and everything. Some of the conditions are deplorable. They live in broken-down motels because there's no housing there.

Those are the real human rights that are stake, and we need to address that issue significantly.

The other thing is the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. That is simply an embarrassment to any country that has any idea of upholding human rights, to not uphold that Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. That's outright shocking and disgusting.

Anyway, I will not dwell any more on that. I only took the liberty to add those two small points.

The other point I want to address is the bona fide justification issue. There's some concern in some of the debates earlier and also in some of the reports about the lack of an interpretive provision in the existing amendment. There's some suggestion that that may not be all that much of a big deal, because of the already existing bona fide justification provision in the human rights code. So band governments, for cultural, linguistic, or other reasons related to the aboriginal culture, may want to discriminate against individuals based on various grounds in order to protect themselves from the mainstream influences of colonization and the assimilative processes of colonization.

I want to make an aside here. We all know that aboriginal communities have a very fundamentally different value system from the western democratic liberal system, where individual rights are paramount versus an aboriginal community where collective...well, not so much collective rights. That's really something that pits aboriginal governments against Canadian governments. It is really more of a value of relationships to the animate and inanimate world. The fundamental value system is based on relationship, based on respect implicating relations.

If you were to imagine a charter of rights or a human rights code that came from an aboriginal tradition, it would look a lot different from the Canadian human rights code, where the emphasis is on individual rights, and the Charter of Rights, which puts the emphasis on individual rights.

You have to keep that in mind. It is really important for aboriginal communities to be able, under the assimilated process, to have a mechanism to maintain their fundamental value system that differs from the Canadian liberal value system.

If we don't have an interpretive clause in there, the bona fide justification clause needs to be that mechanism for aboriginal communities to protect their collective cultural interests.

There are already cases that have used the bona fide justification clause to support that type of initiative. For example, MacNutt v. Shubenacadie, a 1997 decision in the Federal Court trial division, upheld a band's discriminatory actions. And they were justified, based on the bona fide justification provision in the code, because they were protecting a very fundamental collective interest. So they were allowed to do that; it was justified under that.

If the courts and the tribunal continue to use that provision, then it's not that big a deal if there's not an interpretive clause in the amendment. However, that's a big “but”. In fact, an interpretive clause may even water down the bona fide justification clause, because the clause is an absolute defence. That's the second point I want to make.

The third point is the whole issue of consultation. It's 2007, and a lot has changed since 1977, when this amendment was first enacted. Also, a lot has changed in recognition of the aboriginal governments' roles and responsibilities to govern, and their relationship with the Canadian federal government. In that light, and because of the way the Constitution and protection of section 35 rights have been interpreted by the courts, there is a legal requirement, a constitutional obligation, to consult with aboriginal peoples on any matter that affects their interests.

I would like to extend that. It's time now that when the federal government initiates policy or proposes the idea of legislation, it understands that at a minimum, it has to engage jointly in policy analysis and drafting legislation that impacts aboriginal peoples.

A good example of a system in which aboriginal peoples have a say in the legislative drafting process is in Finland in the Sami parliament, which is a separate parliament for aboriginal peoples. Maybe this is a model that Canada needs to think about more seriously, because of the implications of the consultation requirement now under section 35 analysis.

So this legislation should not have gone ahead as it is right now. There should have been joint drafting with the AFN and other aboriginal peoples' representative bodies, and then this amendment should have gone ahead.

Right now, in trying to push this amendment through, even though the aboriginal groups are generally in favour of it because of human rights protections and implications, primarily for aboriginal women, it's still not consistent with the true relationship that existed in Canada between aboriginal peoples and Canada, the true relationship reflected in the Two Row Wampum treaty: nation to nation partnership, and that's how decision-making should be done now.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

If you could, please wrap it up.

[Larry Chartrand]

I'm going to close on that point. I know I'm getting a bit far afield from the actual item of discussion, but it's an important point to keep in mind.

Thank you very much for listening.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

Thank you.

The chair has to leave at 12:50. So if we're not finished the business of the committee, I ask Madam Karetak-Lindell to take the chair.

Also, would the committee members like copies of the 2003 reports that were mentioned by Mr. Chartrand?

[A voice]

Yes, we're interested in those.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

Okay, I'm going to ask the clerk to provide them to committee members.

Where would we like to start?

Madam Karetak-Lindell.

[Nancy Karetak-Lindell, Liberal, Nunavut, NU]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for your interventions, both of you.

You touched on a couple of sections that I have been very worried about throughout these deliberations on Bill C-44. You talked about the duty to consult; Wendy, you also talked about negotiations on conflict management, and Larry, you talked about jointly drafting legislation. Those are very critical bases, I think, of what defines a relationship between aboriginal people and the federal government, because, as I have repeatedly said, we can no longer do things as we used to in the 1960s. I refer to that because that was the time when everybody just made decisions on our behalf without any of our input whatsoever.

I would like to think, as you do, that in 2007 that's behind us, but it's very difficult from where I sit to tolerate how Bill C-44 came about, because we're had numerous witnesses before us who really feel the same way of doing things has come back--that someone in an office in Ottawa decides what policies and legislation are good for us without our input.

I'll come back to specific questions. Negotiation on conflict management is one of the areas I'm really worried about; I'm worried that we're not going to be prepared in those aboriginal communities to deal with the way of resolving conflict. In my culture, for example, as I was mentioning to Wendy, we like to look at win-win situations. We're very uncomfortable with the current court system, which results in a winner and a loser. Because our communities are small, we can't have winner and loser situations all the time, because it divides communities. What we want to be able to see is a win-win situation and a compromise; maybe that's why we have our consensus style of governing.

What I'm worried about with this legislation is that if there isn't enough proper consultation and not enough capacity-building at the communities, we're going to be dividing communities with win-lose situations, whereas we have an opportunity to do win-win if we go about bringing this legislation the right way. Could both of you please comment on that?

[Wendy Cornet]

I think conflict management and resolution issues arise at both the national level and the community level, as you're suggesting in your question.

At the national level there are relatively few examples. One exception is the recently concluded process involving Wendy Grant-John on matrimonial real property. That was a relatively short-term experiment. I am sure there are lessons that can be drawn and built upon from that experience, but you don't see it very often.

Usually at a national level policy discussions and discussions about legislation involve people showing up and having at each other. None of the parties involved generally bring conflict resolution strategies. A lot of energy is devoted to communication strategies, communication lines, but despite a rather large body of literature and expertise on conflict resolution out in the world generally and in Canada in particular, we don't really apply it to this subject matter very often. I don't really know why that is.

I believe the Canadian Human Rights Commission did refer to the need for conflict management capacity at the community level when it appeared before this committee. Your concerns, Ms. Karetak-Lindell, I think are valid ones, particularly given the social context in which disputes over human rights may occur in aboriginal communities, communities being small.

In a community like Ottawa or Halifax, Vancouver or Regina, if a human rights complaint or a legal matter arises it's usually dealt with by strangers, people you don't know. One expert, I think it was Russell Barsh, drew the analogy to say that in the south in our large democracy we're strangers governed by other strangers, whereas in indigenous communities people certainly know one another and many are related to one another. So after a matter that's litigated is finished, those people have to continue to look at each other day after day.

So there probably is--I think the commission is probably right and you're right--a need for something other than the black letter of the law to ensure that you are promoting social cohesion, and not litigation only and have, as you're suggesting, winners and losers at the end of the day and not much social cohesion.

[Larry Chartrand]

Yes, I would like to echo those words. There is a fair bit of infighting with aboriginal communities, between families and clans and that sort of thing, already in existence, and it becomes quite adversarial. But because the Canadian legal system has been imposed on them, the traditional mechanisms for resolving disputes in a more harmonious, consensus-based mediation approach has been devalued, to the point where individuals in those communities would prefer to go to the Canadian system rather than their own traditional system, and further that adversarial kind of milieu.

The amendment here allowing individuals to pursue claims against their band council, for example, will probably exacerbate that a bit, even though the Canadian Human Rights Act offers mediation alternatives and tries to resolve things in a less adversarial format. So there will be an increase, I am sure, but probably not an overwhelming piece beyond what already exists, because a good number of the cases that actually went to the Human Rights Commission actually did get resolved because of the way the tribunal and the courts limited the impact.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

We have to move on to the next question. I have time limits. I don't want to be rude, but I have to watch the clock. The members watch me.

Mr. Lemay.

[Marc Lemay, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you for being here. I really appreciated what I have heard and I would like to tell you about it. I will not go over everything that you have said. I believe that you are really knowledgeable about these communities. My question will be simple and direct. As my university teacher used to say, it is a question that is short but that deserves a long and developed answer.

Do you believe that as we speak, today, on May 17, that the native communities are prepared and ready to face the repeal of section 67 of the act? In other words, are the communities addressed by Bill C-44 ready to deal with this bill today? If the answer is yes, why? And if not, why not?

I want to give you as much time as possible to answer.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

We'll start with Mr. Chartrand.

[Larry Chartrand]

I'd say yes and no. Yes, because—

[Marc Lemay, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

That is not good.

[Larry Chartrand]

There are some aboriginal communities that have the capacity, strong government. Some even get awards for good governance. These communities have strong capacity, in terms of both their personnel and the legal advice and services they get. They probably could handle it without any significant problem. They may need additional resources because of the increase in the cases. But there is also a good number of aboriginal communities that probably would have difficulty responding in a fair way, even if they have valid justification for discriminatory action. They may just not have the resources, the legal counsel. I'm talking about some of the more remote communities, where access to that kind of personnel and skill and knowledge is at a premium. Their efforts are often mostly directed to just survival, let alone human rights abuses based on discrimination.

So it's going to be a wide range. Some communities are going to be quite well prepared, and others are not going to be prepared at all. You can even extend the deadline for five years and they still won't be prepared. So it's going to be a wide range.

[Wendy Cornet]

I would agree with Larry's comments, but I think it's less a question of whether the communities are ready for the repeal of section 67 than what communities feel they need by way of human rights protection. Obviously, allegations and complaints relating to various forms of discrimination arise in aboriginal communities, as they do in non-aboriginal communities, so it would seem rather obvious that you need some kind of mechanism.

The current situation I think is unacceptable, in that the section 67 exemption does operate in a very arbitrary and anomalous way. A study I did for Status of Women made that argument, that whatever merit it had in 1976, prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1982, the way it operates now in terms of what falls in the exemption and what falls out really doesn't make any rational sense. So I think clearly something needs to be done.

The question of whether applying the Canadian Human Rights Act is the best means of human rights protections in first nations communities I think is an interesting question. My colleague here had noted in a paper he did on the Canadian Human Rights Act section 67 exemption issue that the current federal self-government policy doesn't address one way or the other whether or not first nations people have inherent jurisdiction or should be recognized as having jurisdiction over human rights matters, enabling them to pass their own human rights codes. It's rather odd, because the federal self-government policy has three lists of issues that can be negotiated: those the federal government won't negotiate, those that it is willing to negotiate, and other matters, depending on the circumstances, that it may negotiate. And human rights doesn't appear on any of those three lists, although there is a policy with respect to the Canadian Human Rights Act application.

I agree with Larry's answer to your question, “Are they ready?”: I think it depends on the community. But I think the more relevant question is, what is actually needed for human rights protection? I'm sure that first nations people have lots to teach us about what a human rights charter might look like.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

Monsieur Lemay, you have about a minute and a half, or less than that, actually--a minute.

[Marc Lemay, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I will go one step further by asking you a very simple question. If I understand what you are saying, it is not only a matter of governance for first nations. There is also the matter that first nations must be ready and must accept that we repeal section 67, that we abolish it. Do I understand correctly?

[Wendy Cornet]

I guess my own opinion--to the extent that this is relevant to anyone, as I think the opinion of first nations is far more important—is that there's a need to fill. The complaints do come. We may learn now about how to balance collective and individual rights by opening up the application of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

That leaves open the question, in the end, is this the best way to serve human rights needs in first nations communities, through the Canadian Human Rights Act? It's better than nothing. It's better than the rather anomalous way in which section 67 currently operates. But whether we could do better is probably a good question.

[The Chair, Conservative, Colin Mayes]

Madam Crowder, please.