Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to address you on this important study.
I'm sorry, but I didn't have time to send my remarks in advance for translation. However, I have provided copies of my presentation for the interpreters.
I am going to focus my opening remarks on the issue of Canadian participation in the American strategic system for the ballistic missile defence of North America.
I should note that as an international security policy adviser to the then foreign minister, Joe Clark, in the Mulroney government, I was intensely involved in the Canadian decision not to participate on a government-to-government basis in President Reagan's strategic defense initiative, a decision made by Canada in the height of the Cold War in 1985 on the basis that participation in what was then only a research effort, while prudent for the United States to pursue, did not accord with Canadian defence and security priorities. As everyone is well aware, in 2005 Canada decided again not to participate in what had become a program not only of research but of development.
In a nutshell, my position is that both those decisions not to participate were in accordance with Canadian defence and security priorities, and the same holds true today. I will advance six reasons why Canadian participation in U.S. BMD for North America should not be a Canadian priority.
One, the American BMD system, called GMD, or ground-based midcourse missile defense, is not reliable, despite 30 years of investment and billions of dollars spent.
Two, strategic BMD is a spur for Russia and China to build ever more and better offensive systems in order to overwhelm these defences in case they should ever work and be directed at them. It is infinitely cheaper to build more offensive systems. In other words, BMD has very negative security implications.
Three, as senior DND officials testified before you on March 22, there is no military threat to Canada from either North Korea or Iran. In any event, North Korea is primarily a non-proliferation challenge, and addressing it as such—so successful with Iran—is what should be followed with North Korea.
Four, there is very little likelihood that Canadian participation in missile defence would give Canada the much sought-after seat at the BMD table. In 2004 the United States made the decision to locate the ballistic missile defense command in NORTHCOM, not NORAD, and during our subsequent negotiations on participation would not provide Canada with any guarantee of a meaningful operational role in BMD, or even a guarantee that Canadian cities would be defended.
Five, the fact that European members of NATO are participating in a version of theatre missile defence and regional missile defence is an issue that is entirely separate from whether Canada should participate in a strategic system that does not work for North America. There might be a separate debate as to whether Canada should participate in any way in the NATO systems—for example, on ships—but that is not what is under discussion here.
Six, there will be significant financial costs to Canadian BMD participation at a time—this is what you've been discussing this morning—when the Department of National Defence is facing a veritable abyss of delayed procurement, not to mention a major modernization of the north warning system in about 10 years.
For all these reasons, I argue that it is not in Canada's defence and security interests to pursue participation in the American ballistic missile defence program for North America at this time. Let me pursue just a couple of these reasons in a bit more detail.
On the BMD not working, I leave that for questions for those who want to follow up on it. I'll turn to reason number two, which is the vital arms control dimension, bearing in mind that awhile past I was the Canadian ambassador for disarmament to the UN and have a special interest in those issues.
It is worth briefly recalling why the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, which severely restricted ballistic missile defences. It was because of a straightforward proposition. It is much easier and much cheaper to build more offensive systems to overwhelm defensive systems like BMD than it is to develop a reliable defensive system, and thus, if pursued, they risk triggering an offensive nuclear arms race.
At a minimum, both Russia and China have to take into account the potential effect of a functioning BMD system negating their retaliatory capability, which in turn means they must keep open the possibility of building up offensive forces as a hedge against U.S. BMD development, whether or not they believe American assertions that right now the system is aimed not at them but at rogue states.
The American BMD system also acts as a catalyst to nuclear weapons modernization, as Russia and China seek not only increased numbers of nuclear weapons but also increased manoeuvrability to evade defences. Preventing these incredibly destabilizing developments was the whole rationale behind the ABM treaty, which George W. Bush abandoned in 2002 in order to pursue the BMD chimera. It is precisely these destabilizing developments that we have seen increasing since then, especially with respect to manoeuvrability.
On reason number three, the low level of threat from North Korea that can best be addressed by the non-proliferation challenge, you've heard some testimony on this, so I'll leave that follow-up for questions.
On reason number four, which is that participation in BMD will not give Canada a meaningful seat at the table, physically sitting at the table does not mean you have a say. In this regard, I would point to the excellent study commissioned by DND, “NORAD in Perpetuity”, dated March 31, 2014, and in particular page 34, which draws the same conclusion.
In the interest of time, I'll not add to my prior comments on the lack of relevance of NATO missile defences to Canadian participation in the U.S. strategic BMD for North America.
On my final point, there will be significant financial costs to Canadian BMD participation at a time when there are so many competing priorities. The “NORAD in Perpetuity” report referenced earlier goes into this issue of costs.
For all these reasons, seeking Canadian participation in BMD at this time, in my view, does not serve Canada's priority defence, security, and non-proliferation interests, and that's what it's all about: what are the priorities? We can't do everything.
I would like to add one further point. On October 28, 2014, in the hearings then being held before this committee on the defence of North America, one of the authors of the above-noted report, “NORAD in Perpetuity”, Professor James Fergusson, gave testimony. He, until that point, had surely been Canada's foremost academic expert on and proponent of Canadian participation in American BMD, but that was not his testimony on that day, October 28, 2014.
He had, after all, worked on the “NORAD in Perpetuity” report, which highlighted the extremely low probability of Canada's getting a meaningful seat at the BMD table, as well as the costs associated with Canadian participation. To these reasons, he added the low level of ballistic missile threat from rogue states and the many pressing needs of National Defence in relation to procurement, not least for “large chunks of the Canadian navy”, as he put it.
For all of these reasons, he stated in answer to a direct question about what priority he would give to BMD, “...it's not one that I would suggest is a high priority right now”.
Thank you. I very much look forward to your questions.