Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Bill C-49, an act to authorize remedial and disciplinary measures in relation to members of certain administrative tribunals, to reorganize and dissolve certain federal agencies and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.
This bill was tabled last June 14 by the President of the Treasury Board and would rationalize federal organizations, boards, commissions and advisory bodies. It affects 46 agencies, of which 7 will be dissolved and 39 restructured or modified.
Bill C-49 provides for major changes in the operation of administrative tribunals. These tribunals, which are often less well known than superior courts, nonetheless have a major impact on the daily lives of Canadians and of Quebecers.
These tribunals often hand down more rulings than superior courts. In addition, their rulings often have very important consequences for citizens and for the Canadian government. In fact, there is no longer any doubt about the importance administrative tribunals have acquired in recent years. They are regularly the site of battles between the government and private citizens seeking rulings on the respect of their rights.
There is currently a bill to reform administrative tribunals before the Quebec national assembly. Questions as important as the independence and impartiality of administrative tribunal judges are now being discussed.
This same problem can also be found at the federal level. Bill C-49 could have provided a solution to the fundamental problem of partisan appointments to administrative tribunals. The Liberals would rather stick their heads in the sand.
In an era when the public is so cynical about politicians, the President of the Treasury Board would have shown honourable courage in tackling the question of political appointments to administrative tribunals. Instead, he introduces even more partisan rules, increasing the control of the political arm over administrative tribunals.
Certain provisions in the bill are of particular interest to me. The bill contains a new mechanism for removing from office persons appointed by the Governor in Council to administrative tribunals. Those appointed may, after certain procedures have been followed, be removed from their duties for just cause, by the governor in council.
The process set out in the Bill can be initiated by the chairperson of the administrative tribunal by asking the minister concerned whether the members of the tribunal in question ought to be subjected to disciplinary or corrective measures. The chairperson must cite one of the following reasons: incapacity, misconduct, failure to properly execute the office, or incompatibility.
After the request is received, the minister may take one or more of the following steps, at his discretion: obtain information himself, refer the matter for mediation, request an inquiry, and/or take no further measures. In the case of an inquiry, the governor in council may appoint a judge of a superior court to conduct the inquiry.
Then, only after a inquiry report has been submitted, can the minister recommend that the member be removed from office or suspended without pay, or impose any other disciplinary measure or any remedial measure.
The Minister's recommendations are totally at his discretion, regardless of the content of the report.
The bill standardizes the appointment of chairpersons of administrative tribunals. All will henceforth be designated rather than appointed. Such a major modification makes the chairperson highly vulnerable to political pressures from the government, which can quite simply designate a new one, any time it sees fit. I shall speak later of the specific situation of the Immigration and Refugee Board, which is, as we know, the most important administrative tribunal in Canada.
These new measures are likely to undermine the credibility of administrative tribunals still further and, particularly, to make them still more dependent upon political power. Without an in-depth reform of appointments to administrative tribunals, measures that seriously hamper the independence and impartiality of these tribunals should not be introduced.
As we all know, the President of the Treasury Board refuses to deal with this important issue, because he does not want to give up the sacrosanct powers of ministers to appoint the members of administrative tribunals. Any reform of or change to administrative tribunals must tackle the arbitrary way in which administrative tribunal judges are appointed and their mandates renewed. Political patronage in a quasi-judicial process should have no place in a modern democracy like ours.
The Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien defines administrative tribunal as follows: ``a generally autonomous and independent body, which the government has empowered to settle disputes between itself and its citizens''.
In 1995, the President of the Quebec Bar Association clearly stated in this regard: "The lack of job security may have unexpected psychological impact on the decisions of a person who may be more concerned about pleasing the government than rendering a fair judgment".
Administrative tribunal members may even be reluctant to set legal precedents favouring citizens at the expense of the government.
I would now like to analyze some provisions of this bill which deal with the Immigration and Refugee Board.
On March 2, 1995, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the introduction of a bill aimed at reducing from two to one the membership of the refugee status determination tribunal of the IRB.
The bill amends section 69.1 in the Immigration Act. This provision provides that two members are usually needed to constitute a quorum at hearings on refugee claims. Except in three particular cases, any split decision by a two-member tribunal is deemed to favour the claimant. Consequently, the claimant needs to convince only one member of the validity of his claim to be recognized as a refugee under the Geneva convention.
This bill will modify this system so that all refugee claims can be heard by a one-commissioner tribunal, except in complex cases in which the chair may assign more than one member.
Let us take a historical look at the make-up of this board. In 1985, at the government's request, Rabbi Gunther Plaut tabled a report on refugee status determination in Canada. The basic condition of this new system was that a high quality hearing be held before a decision maker. Three models were suggested, one of which provided for a hearing before a one-member board, except where a negative determination were made, in which case the board would be made up of three members. It also provided for an appeal, where authorized, to the Federal Court.
In the fall of 1985, the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration reviewed the Plaut report. The committee did not approve any of the three suggested models and decided on a two-member board hearing. In the case of a split decision, the claim would be approved. It would also be possible to appeal a decision before the Federal Court, if the court agreed to hear the appeal.
The committee felt it was desirable for decisions to be made by two persons. Its rationale was the following: the issue of credibility is paramount in processing refugee status claims, as claimants generally cannot present oral or written evidence in support of their claims. That is why it is better to have two persons determine whether or not the claimant is truthful.
The committee also suggested that a divided decision be viewed as a favourable decision, thereby giving the benefit of the doubt to the claimant, which is in keeping with the policy of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, provided of course that the claimant's story is credible.
This can be a controversial issue. For some, particularly refugee advocacy groups, the current system, which requires a favourable decision by one member only, greatly reduces the risk of a bad decision being made. It also appears that a number of members prefer to share the onus of the decision and thus develop a certain collegiality.
With all due respect for these organizations, I believe that a tribunal made up of only one member will cost less, be easier to set up and, more importantly, will allow the IRB to hear a greater number of cases. This, however, is based on the assumption that the board will have more hearing rooms available.
It is to be noted that the delays and the backlog in the processing of IRB files are considerable and in fact unacceptable. It should also be pointed out that no other tribunal in Canada has an initial decision process similar to the IRB's, not even those hearing criminal cases, where the consequences may be very serious for the accused.
A one-person tribunal may have the effect of making the member more responsible. If the member proved to be unable to make decisions alone, he would not deserve to keep his job. In any case, there should be a review process, in case the member makes an erroneous decision.
When the member for York West was the Liberal Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, he was strongly in favour of an internal review system at the IRB. In November 1993, he said he wanted to amend the refugee determination process, so that unfavourable decisions could be appealed within the Board. The former minister even said that the lack of an appeal process was a flaw.
While I agree with the idea of having one instead of two members hearing a claim, I wonder about the qualifications of some members appointed by this government. The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, of which I am a vice-chairperson, reviewed several appointments and reappointments.
In many cases, the appointments are exclusively partisan. In fact, there is only one way to become an IRB commissioner, and that is to have worked at some time or other for the Liberal Party of Canada, or to have friends in the party. And the salary is very interesting: $86,000 and up annually. The length of service to the party also determines the length of the appointment: one year, two years, three years or four years.
I would like to give a few examples of the patronage appointments of this Liberal government. It should be noted that in the 1993 election campaign the Liberals condemned the political patronage of the Conservatives of the time. The Liberal Party of Canada was going to be a strong advocate of honesty and integrity in government if elected, or so it told us.
But now Mr. Interjit Bal has been made an IRB commissioner. His previous experience included working for the Prime Minister during his leadership campaign and for the Liberal Party of Canada during the 1993 election. He was also chair of the ethno-cultural committee of the Liberal Party of Canada. He was forced to admit to the standing committee examining his appointment that he came into Canada illegally. He was therefore obliged to step down from his duties as commissioner.
I will mention other partisan appointments to the IRB. Auguste Choquette, former Liberal member; Raymonde Folco, former Liberal candidate in the riding of Laval East; Patricia Davey, married to an assistant to former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau; Milagos Eustaquoi, former Liberal Party candidate; Janet Susan Rowsell, who worked for the Minister of Justice.
I was an Unemployment Insurance Commission referee from the union movement. During the Conservative reign, I often criticized the partisan appointments handed out by Brian Mulroney. The present government continues to appoint faithful Liberals, often very incompetent ones, to chair arbitration boards. The same situation can be found in the Bank of Canada, the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Pension Commission, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and so on.
It is very important that the initial hearing of a refugee claim be of the utmost quality, as I have said here in the past. The board members must, therefore, be competent and well informed.
On March 3, 1995, in response to accusations of patronage, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the creation of an advisory committee composed of a chairperson and four members. I have, however, been extremely disappointed with the outcome, for the committee continues to appoint incompetent board members. It is a known fact that there has been no improvement over the way things were before, under the Conservatives.
In closing, I would like to invite the Standing Committee on Government Operations to have the part relating to the IRB examined by the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, since this is a highly technical matter and our committee has something to say on this. There are organizations which want to come and testify before the committee, and the chairperson of the Standing Committee on Government Operations gave us the particular opportunity to contribute our opinion on Bill C-49.