Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to contribute to the debate on Bill C-279 sponsored by the hon. member for Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, an opposition member from my home province of B.C., for whom I have respect. I think he knows that.
We studied Bill C-279 and, upon reflection, it is clear to me that the proposed amendments are unnecessary. Here is why I will be voting against Bill C-279.
As members may already be aware, the bill proposes to add the undefined terms “gender identity” and “gender expression” as prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act and into the aggravated sentencing provisions and hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal Code. I understand that the underlying purpose of these legislative amendments is to provide explicit protection for transsexual and transgendered Canadians. I have sympathy with the intention. However, I believe this bill as drafted does not equal the purpose.
I would like to turn first to a consideration of the proposed amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act. The purpose of this act is to help create a society in which individuals have access to equal opportunity without discrimination. The grounds that determine what will be considered discriminatory include race, national or ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability and several others.
It is also worth recalling that this act prohibits discrimination in employment and services in areas of federal jurisdiction. For example, it protects individuals who are employed by the federal public service or federally regulated industries such as banks and airlines.
In interpreting and applying this act, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has already accepted and considered several complaints brought by transsexuals under the ground of “sex”. In fact, the ground of sex in anti-discrimination laws is interpreted broadly and has evolved over the years. It is now understood to cover discrimination complaints based not just on sex but also on gender attributes, pregnancy, childbirth and, more recently, transsexualism. Therefore, for those complaints brought by transsexuals, the tribunal has used the existing grounds already contained in the act.
For example, in one complaint brought by a transsexual inmate in a federal prison, the tribunal dealt with the complaint and Correctional Service Canada developed a policy to deal with potential future cases. In another complaint brought by a transsexual person against a bank, again the tribunal dealt with the complaint under the ground of sex. In fact, I presided over a successful mediation of just such a case when I was a member of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.
In deciding that transsexuals are already protected by our federal human rights law, the tribunal's approach is consistent with that taken by the provincial human rights tribunals that have also found discrimination against transsexuals to be covered by the existing ground of sex.
Since Canadian tribunals and courts have already recognized discrimination against transsexuals as a form of sex discrimination, what is the bill's purpose in proposing to add these two new grounds to the act, which do not refer to transsexualism itself but to undefined concepts of gender identity and gender expression?
The point of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act is not to identify particular groups. For example, the act does not mention men and women but the broader ground of sex. It does not list Christianity, Judaism, Islam or other specific religions but simply includes the ground of religion. The act contains the ground of ethnic origin but again does not list out specific minority groups. The act is structured in this way to treat all Canadians equally and fairly and to avoid singling out for recognition specific manifestations of a given characteristic. This bill departs from that approach.
For similar reasons, we may wish to ask ourselves whether it is necessary to add these grounds to the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code. The section in question in the code lists a number of deemed aggravating circumstances on sentencing, including evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability or any other similar factor. Again, the list includes sex and it also refers to “any other similar factor”, so judges may already be able to impose longer sentences for hate crimes against transsexual persons in appropriate circumstances.
Thus, it appears there are already the necessary legal protections in place to protect transsexuals. I am not sure why it is necessary to add these new grounds when the tribunals and courts have been clear that complaints brought by transsexuals will be dealt with under the ground of sex and this ground is also included in the aggravated sentencing provision.
Furthermore, this bill adds even further uncertainty, because the terms proposed are not commonly used and are not defined by the bill itself, hence the questions we heard earlier.
It is my understanding that “gender identity” means individuals' self-conception as being male or female or their sense of themselves as male or female. It is my further understanding that “gender expression” refers to how a person's gender identity is communicated to others through behaviour, speech, dress or mannerisms. However, as these terms are neither commonly understood nor defined, their use would introduce vagueness into the law. I am particularly concerned with the unclear term “gender expression”.
We should ask ourselves what new sorts of discrimination claims would be brought before the commission and the tribunal, if this ground were to be added to the Canadian Human Rights Act. How would employers know what kind of workplace behaviour and expression would be prohibited? Would a federally regulated employer, such as an airline or transport company, be able to require the wearing of a prescribed uniform, for example? The answers to these questions are not clear to me, and they are questions we should consider carefully.
Finally, I would like to consider the role of tribunals and courts in shaping public policy. As I have said, these terms are vague and left undefined by the proposed bill. How can we ask tribunals and courts to apply something that we as legislators do not clearly understand? The fact that we have no idea how tribunals and courts would interpret these terms is also an issue we should consider.
In conclusion, I have explained that the amendments proposed by this bill are largely unnecessary, given the jurisprudence to date. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has already dealt with several complaints brought by transsexuals under the existing ground of sex discrimination. I mentioned a few. There is no need to add new and vague terms to the Canadian Human Rights Act or the Criminal Code. I would therefore urge my colleagues on both sides of the House to oppose this bill for those reasons.