National Defence committee  Absolutely. There already is. There's a pretty large appetite in the international community for diplomacy to be given a chance. What we have to bear in mind here is that in terms of any other approach there is no effective military response. Any military response is catastrophic.

National Defence committee  Thank you very much. Yes, I undiplomatically indicated my frustration, and I apologize for that. Before I jump into this question, I want to add another point. I think the decisive point in then prime minister Paul Martin's decision to withdraw Canada's request to participate in 2005 was that he could get no guarantee from the United States of a meaningful operational role for Canada—a say, as opposed to a passive seat at the table—and he could get no guarantee that Canada would be defended.

National Defence committee  I think it's obvious. It's clear—manifestly clear—that sanctions have not worked. The long history of sanctions has not worked to prevent North Korea from continuing to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The classic statement about sanctions is that they must be part of a larger strategy, that the best they can hope to do is slow things down, and that in the meantime you should be pursuing an effective solution.

National Defence committee  Thirty seconds? Wow. Gee.

National Defence committee  Yes, it does. In my written statement I outline two different proposals. I outline a proposal for a comprehensive solution, which would see North Korea renouncing nuclear weapons—sadly, I think the time for that has passed—and then a much more recent proposal by the Chinese and the Russians, which they call a “double-freeze”: a missile and nuclear freeze by the DPRK and a freeze on large-scale joint exercises by the U.S. and the Republic of Korea on the other side.

National Defence committee  Thank you very much. Just by way of interesting comment, I'm a lawyer, a former ambassador, and president of a very small independent think tank, but I am not an academic. I'm a practitioner. In my written submission, I made the following arguments. I'll list them because of course there's no time to go into them in detail, and the submission has been circulated.

National Defence committee  No, I have not.

National Defence committee  Of course, there were many authors of that report. I would just refer to the report and what it says, with respect. They weren't talking about the level of the threat, in the report. They were talking about the seat at the table, the fact that NORTHCOM has the command, and why there's a “double-hatted” factor at the operational level.

National Defence committee  No, it does not. We receive all of our money from small donors across Canada. The only money that doesn't come from small donors across Canada is—I guess you could say—an indirect subsidy. In the summer, we get one intern under the Canada student employment program, which subsidizes the salary of that individual.

National Defence committee  Well, I want to talk a bit more about the state of the system. I've honed in on the problem of the radar and the fact that it's acknowledged that there is no ability to discriminate. Experts like Philip Coyle say that there will never be such an ability to discriminate, but I also want to go back to the other side of it, and that's the interceptor missile, the so-called kill vehicle.

National Defence committee  Again, I draw on other witnesses here and in the past and on one of the authors of the NORAD perpetuity report, Dr. Charron, who have emphasized the importance of the Arctic for Canada in many ways, including security. Witnesses, including National Defence witnesses before this committee, have noted that, in stark contrast with the breakdown in relations with respect to Ukraine, in the Arctic context, in the context of the Arctic Council, cooperation has continued apace with Russia.

National Defence committee  When I was talking about offensive systems, I was talking about the very negative international security and arms control consequences of pursuing missile defences. I'd like to make the point that in my view it's not inconsistent at all to argue that the BMD system, as it's currently configured, doesn't work, but that prudent Russian and Chinese defence planners must hedge against the possibility that it might someday work.

National Defence committee  Initially when the previous studies were done, the two countries that were pointed at were North Korea and Iran. Well, here today, no one is pointing at Iran. Why aren't they pointing at Iran? It's that Iran is no longer a threat in this area, or that it didn't have the capability such that it would have become a threat.

National Defence committee  Thank you. I'm very glad for the opportunity to clarify. I did not make any reference to Canada's role at the United Nations and equate that in any way with the BMD discussion. There must have been a problem with the translation. No, I made no such comment. One can make an argument on the arms control side—for example, with respect to North Korea and certainly with respect to Russia—that not participating in BMD might enhance our ability in a multilateral negotiation to play a constructive role, but no, there's no relationship with our role at the United Nations.

National Defence committee  Well, they're all important. You see, if you give reasons and then someone says, “If we pretend that none of these reasons will apply, will you agree with me?”, I'm not willing. I think it's not a reasonable premise.