National Defence committee  Absolutely, and thank you for that pertinent question. There is a growing consensus on emerging technologies that can be integrated into militaries. This essentially poses all sorts of questions related to the ethical implications, legal implications and uncharted territory from a normative perspective.

National Defence committee  The question is, what policy direction does this procurement strategy respond to? As I said, “Strong, Secure, Engaged” is already from 2017. Six years is a long time in terms of the evolution of the security landscape and the security environment. All of these conversations, even about F-35s or about new capabilities or shipbuilding—all of these things—must beg the question: What is the intended role of the Canadian Armed Forces?

National Defence committee  Absolutely, and thank you very much for that pertinent question. I believe everyone on the committee is familiar with the NATO push for spending 2%—or beyond 2%—of GDP and devoting it to military spending. I think there are several misconceptions around this debate. First of all, including in my conversations with colleagues and with everyday Canadians, there is this notion that Canada is somehow lagging and that Canada is catching up, or that NATO is catching up somehow in terms of its military expenditures.

National Defence committee  That is correct, and I think Canada could play a very constructive role in broadening the definition of what is considered security and what counts towards those targets that are set. The traditional understanding of security, a narrow understanding of security, will by definition involve, in the next few months, years and decades, including consideration of the intersection between environmental degradation and security.

National Defence committee  Absolutely. Thank you again for that relevant question. The first thing to say is that is not just the Arms Trade Treaty. You're absolutely right that Canada is a party to the international Arms Trade Treaty, and that comes with legal obligations. However, there are also domestic export controls that Canada needs to abide by when it makes its export decisions.

National Defence committee  Absolutely—

National Defence committee  Thank you.

National Defence committee  Absolutely. Thank you very much for that question. The first thing I will say is that one of those Ds—and we refer to this package as “the five Ds”—is indeed defence. Ploughshares does not—and it's not my intention here—question or challenge the very basic notion that defence is and can be a very important element of Canada's projection into the world and that we need an adequate and reliable level of preparedness for the Canadian Armed Forces.

National Defence committee  Good afternoon, Chair. Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. I am speaking on behalf of Project Ploughshares, a Canadian organization that has been dedicated to matters of arms control, disarmament, Canadian foreign policy and international security for nearly five decades.

Foreign Affairs committee  I can appreciate the question, but I cannot speculate as to the factors that were in place. I can say with certainty that the embargo was in place and there was every expectation that the Canadian government would have known. If exports continue despite an arms embargo, there are only two explanations.

Foreign Affairs committee  Yes, indeed, and it's in violation of the Arms Trade Treaty, which specifically prohibits exports to countries where there is an arms embargo in place.

Foreign Affairs committee  Thank you, Mr. Bergeron. I would say that Turkey has certainly shown itself willing to leverage its membership in NATO to get other countries to skirt their Arms Trade Treaty obligations. We cannot control that. We cannot control what the Turkish government does or the phone calls their political leaders make.

Foreign Affairs committee  Yes, it should, but the risk was foreseeable at the time that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh erupted. Turkey had already exhibited similar behaviour and Canadian equipment had already been found in places where it shouldn't have been.

Foreign Affairs committee  On the first point, I want to make it very clear that it is not a matter of opinion or interpretation to say that there should not be political interference. I'm not saying that it doesn't happen, but I am saying it should not happen, and certainly not in a country like Canada that prizes itself on having strong export controls.

Foreign Affairs committee  Absolutely. Any deviation from the end-user assurances is categorically a violation of the Arms Trade Treaty. There is no question about that. We cannot—