Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Electoral Participation Act

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-65 this evening in the House, the electoral participation act. As the title of this bill suggests, one of its key priorities is to encourage participation in the electoral process. We know that democratic engagement rests on trust in our electoral system, and that is why Bill C-65 proposes to enhance safeguarding measures in the Canada Elections Act.

As we all know, Canada's democracy is among the strongest and most stable in the world thanks in large part to the Canada Elections Act, which is the fundamental legislative framework that regulates our elections in this great nation. We have every reason to be proud of this legislation, but we are not immune to the global challenges that modernized democracies face. The integrity of the electoral process in the lead-up to, during and after elections is a prerequisite for trust in our democracy. This is why it is essential that we continue to address evolving threats to our democracy through regular improvements to the Canada Elections Act. This helps ensure that our system remains robust, resilient and equipped to keep pace with the issues of our time.

It should come as no surprise that safeguarding our elections includes measures to mitigate foreign interference. Foreign interference can take many forms, including social media campaigns designed to sow disinformation. The Communications Security Establishment's latest report highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries increasingly seeking to influence our elections. We and all Canadians have a right to be concerned about these threats. This is why the government has been proactive in taking steps to counter foreign interference.

Our government's work to protect our democracy began as early as 2016, when we tabled Bill C-22. It led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, a committee that assembles members from both chambers of Parliament to review matters concerning national security and intelligence.

In 2018, the government put forward Bill C-59, which enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, giving the agency the mandate to review and investigate all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. That same year, we also introduced Bill C-76, which modernized the Canada Elections Act and introduced a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition preventing foreigners from unduly influencing electors, a prohibition against foreign third parties from spending on election-related activities and a prohibition against third parties from using any foreign funds.

In 2019, we put in place the plan to protect Canada's democracy, which included the security and intelligence threats to elections, or SITE, task force. The plan was subsequently updated in advance of the 2021 general election.

Most recently, we introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, which complements measures to further safeguard our federal elections and mitigate foreign influence in Bill C-65, which I am speaking to today. Finally, last September, our government launched the public inquiry into foreign interference. We look forward to receiving the commissioner's final report as well as recommendations.

These substantial government-wide initiatives demonstrate this government's commitment to remaining vigilant in our efforts to protect our electoral system. This commitment is further reflected in the safeguarding measures proposed through Bill C-65. I would like to highlight how this bill proposes to better protect our elections from foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of technology, all of which seek to erode trust in our institutions. We do this so that Canadians can feel safe and confident when participating in our democracy.

First, we know that election interference can happen at all times and not just during elections. This is why Bill C-65 proposes to extend the application of the existing ban on undue foreign influence at all times, rather than being limited to the election period. This means, for example, that the ban on foreign entities unduly influencing voters to vote a certain way or influencing them to refrain from voting would extend to all times.

Second, Bill C-65 would create a clearer and more consistent definition of foreign entity activities under the act to close any and all gaps. For example, currently foreign entities can circumvent the law by having more than one purpose, where the ban on undue influence is limited to a foreign entity whose only purpose is to unduly influence voters. That would no longer be possible under Bill C-65. The bill proposes that foreign entities who have even just one of their primary activities as unduly influencing electors would be captured.

Third, Bill C-65 proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous foreign and dark money from entering our elections. This includes banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for regulated activities by third parties and political actors.

Bill C-65 would introduce important new financing rules for third parties. Allow me to explain. Bill C-65 would allow third parties to use only contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This includes partisan activities, partisan advertising, election advertising and election surveys. This means that third parties would no longer be able to use funds received from any other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated expenses. For greater transparency, third parties would also need to report on the details of the individuals who contributed in total over $200, including names, addresses and amounts of each contribution.

We understand that third parties may not all receive contributions and may have their own revenue they wish to use for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties who meet the threshold of 10% or less of their overall annual revenue and contributions would also be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. In addition, third parties would be required to provide financial statements to Elections Canada proving the revenue is their own.

The amendments to enhance transparency on the source of third party funding are important. Under the current rules, third parties are required to report only on contributions given to them for election purposes. Contributions received for other purposes may be mixed into the third party's general revenue, leaving a transparency gap as to where the funds came from.

The Chief Electoral Officer spoke to this concern in his June 2022 recommendations report tabled here in Parliament. He noted that the proportion of third party reporting on the use of their own funds for regulated expenses increased significantly, from 8% in 2011 to 37% in 2019 and 63% in 2021. This increasing trend in third party financing is concerning, which is why the government is taking action through Bill C-65. Let me reiterate, however, that third parties who do not meet the threshold would still be able to participate in regulated activities, but they would have to do so with the contributions they received as donations from Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

The next element I would like to speak on is disinformation. Disinformation, a key tactic by malign actors, aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in the electoral process. It seeks to manipulate voters and electoral processes through intentional falsehoods, often spread online, as well as, quite frankly, intimidation at times.

In 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer called disinformation about the electoral process the most important threat to Canada's election mandate. Security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity. In the 2021 national electors study conducted by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 71% of electors were concerned that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or major impact on the electoral outcome. This included 37% who thought it could have a major impact. As noted by the Chief Electoral Officer, intelligence officials and leading academics, the use and impact of disinformation is not limited to the election period.

Bill C-65 aims to build confidence in our electoral process and our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions to address these threats. In particular, the bill would introduce a ban on false statements about the voting process that are deliberately made to disrupt the conduct or the results of an election, all while respecting the principles of free expression and open dialogue.

Amendments provide clear guidance on the type of intentional false statements that could be made or published to ensure that contraventions of the act are clear and enforceable. This includes making or publishing false or misleading statements relating to who may vote in an election; the voting registration process; when, where and how to vote; whom to vote for; the process to become a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; or the results of an election.

Another element I would like to address is the potential misuse of technology. Technology, as we all know, has helped revolutionize democracy, but it also gives rise to risks. For example, content generated by artificial intelligence is becoming harder to distinguish from reality. When paired with disinformation, artificial intelligence such as deepfakes poses a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic videos, audio and text content that can depict people saying or doing things they never said or did.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-65 would amend existing prohibitions in the act that can lend themselves to the misuse of artificial intelligence, namely false statements, impersonation and misleading publications, to provide clarity that they apply regardless of the means used. This would mean, for example, that the prohibition on impersonating the Chief Electoral Officer, an election official, or a candidate would apply regardless of the technology that might be used now, to include deepfakes or other technologies that may evolve in the future.

Bill C-65 would also extend the scope of the existing ban on using a computer to affect the results of an election, to now apply to the use of a computer to disrupt the conduct of an election.

The last element I would like to speak about and highlight is the importance of the personal safety of those people who participate in our electoral process. As my hon. colleagues know well, the threat environment continues to evolve. There has, sadly, been a surge in vandalism at constituency offices, increasingly violent online discourse and threats made against party leaders, candidates and election officials, as witnessed during the 2021 general election.

Bill C-65 therefore seeks to address some of these concerns by providing increased privacy and safety to electoral participants. For example, returning officers' personal information would be better protected by removing the requirement for them to publish their home address in the Canada Gazette; rather, only their municipality and province of residence would be published.

We have also seen reports of or have personally experienced a growing uncivil discourse and behaviour targeting members of Parliament, including me. Members from all parties have spoken out against unacceptable harassment and threats, as well as intimidation.

Indeed, the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons recently noted that harassment of people elected to serve this very institution has skyrocketed, increasing 800% in the last five years. To respond to this alarming trend, Bill C-65 proposes two changes to the disclosure of requirements for regulated fundraising events over $200 that include a prominent attendee, such as a party leader. To ensure the safety of all participants, the requirement to provide five days' advance public notice of such regulated fundraising events would be repealed. To ensure ongoing transparency, precise location details for events would continue to be provided to the Chief Electoral Officer as part of the party's postevent reporting requirements under the act.

However, to protect the security of hosts of events who engage in politics or book a political event, the requirement for a public-facing postevent report 30 days later would only include the municipality and the province of the event. This approach aims to prevent bad actors from undermining the safety of participants and hosts at these events. It aims to strike an appropriate balance between the very real security threats faced and the ongoing need for transparency.

In closing, I know that safeguarding our democracy is a priority shared by all of my hon. colleagues in this House. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act proposed in Bill C-65 build on existing safeguards and propose a number of targeted but critical improvements to continue to build trust in our democratic processes.

I am confident that all members of Parliament can work together to ensure that Bill C-65 is studied and passed in time for all measures to come into force before the next fixed-date general election.

Democratic Institutions

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, we just passed Bill C-70 in the House, with the support of the Bloc Québécois, and sent it to the Senate for further study. This bill will allow for more rigorous and regular information sharing with the premiers of the provinces and territories on issues of foreign interference and national security that involve them.

We are working in a respectful and collaborative way to fight to protect our democracy together.

Electoral Participation Act

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Mr. Speaker, if anything has come to light in the last few months, it is the importance of all legislation looking at the potential of foreign interference, the prevention of and identification of foreign interference. This needs to be implemented in all legislation. Yes, there are some components within this bill that look at addressing that, as the member mentioned, such payments or donations that are not allowed to be made through money orders or cryptocurrencies, as well as looking at who can donate and ensuring they are permanent residents and Canadian residents. These components are part of a bigger puzzle of work that we need to be doing together to ensure that foreign interference is identified, prevented, avoided altogether and that there be accountability when it does happen.

I was happy that all members of Parliament voted together on the recent foreign interference bill, Bill C-70. My hope is that we will see that work, and this work, strengthened, so this is no longer as problematic as has come to light in the last few months.

Democratic Institutions

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of this House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canada; they affect all Canadians. That is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference that are set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines.

Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records and how they are intended to be used is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government so that any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end.

Cabinet confidences are documents that are prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is, and has been since Confederation, a Westminster system of government. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries.

Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called cabinet collective responsibility. These principles complement each other, as members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal, deliberate, and even disagree freely around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

The secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is therefore paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has been long understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences. In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government.”

Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act, but rather a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference. Since the inquiry was established last year, the set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission have already been provided during the commission's first phase of work. Those terms of reference were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House. As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and will continue to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions.

The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December and will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and democratic institutions.

[David Morrison]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The issue, as it has just been stated, is of central concern to all of us. It featured heavily in my visit to Beijing, and I know all of the issues around foreign interference will be part of my dialogue with the incoming ambassador.

The government, as I think the committee is aware, has recently tabled legislation in Bill C-70 that will shore up the home game. It will help Canada's more domestically oriented ministries and institutions protect themselves from foreign interference from whichever country it emanates. We in the foreign ministry will play a supporting role, including by making this part of our ongoing dialogue with our Chinese counterparts at all levels.

Opposition Motion—Government's Economic Analysis on Carbon Pricing

[Han Dong, Independent, Don Valley North, ON]

Madam Speaker, on a point of order. I apologize for the interruption.

I missed the earlier vote on the third reading of Bill C-70. I humbly ask for the unanimous consent of the House to allow my vote to be recorded as in favour.

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Greg Fergus]

It being 3:18 p.m., pursuant to order made on Wednesday, June 12, the House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the motion at the third reading stage of Bill C-70.

Call in the members.

The House resumed from June 12 consideration of the motion that Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the third time and passed.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Those protocols will be strengthened, in my opinion, by Bill C-70. I want to focus on part 2 to Bill C-70, which would amend the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create a number of new offences, as follows:

(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;

There would be some elements of foreign interference.

(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose [that is] prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and

(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.

I've summarized those offences.

Do you believe, Mr. Dolhai, that those additional provisions will help provide additional tools to law enforcement, including the PPSC, for the purposes of protecting our national security?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Dolhai, congratulations on your nomination. You have had a distinguished career, underpinned by the values, in your own words, of hard work, but also a real commitment to the law, which is a vehicle to serve people, including to protect our communities. I listened very carefully to the outline of your own journey through the PPSC—starting at its inception; taking on a senior role; contributing to the drafting of national security legislation, in what ultimately became the Anti-terrorism Act; and overseeing prosecutions, including one in which I was involved, the Toronto 18.

I raise that case because it was a seminal case. It was a case that involved a conspiracy around a self-radicalized domestic terror cell. It implicated a number of different agencies, not only the PPSC and conventional law enforcement but equally intelligence agencies. I raise this in the current climate because one of the important debates that is occurring right now is how we use intelligence and convert intelligence into admissible evidence for the purposes of prosecuting individuals who have been charged under national security provisions.

Having had the benefit of seeing Bill C-70, and understanding that it is currently making its way through Parliament, can you, in your own extensive experience, shed some light on how we can improve the protocols around taking intelligence and converting it into evidence for the purposes of prosecuting individuals who are charged under national security provisions?

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, NDP, Carol Hughes]

Pursuant to order made earlier today, all questions necessary to dispose of the third reading stage of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, are deemed put and a recorded division deemed requested and deferred until Thursday, June 13, at the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, it is an honour to rise in this place to speak to Bill C-70. A foreign influence registry is something we have wanted to have, but we also recognize that there are concerns that overbroad application of such a registry could in itself inadvertently result in stigmatization of diaspora communities within Canada. The bill needs to be carefully administered, and much of what remains of what we would be passing, in a breathtakingly expedited fashion, would be be left to further regulations.

There are still a lot of questions as the bill moves forward. I have to say that, having the right, as any member of this place did, to say no to unanimous consent, I could have insisted that we have greater study. I have to say that I wish we did have greater study, but there was the timing and the consensus, and I am always inspired when I see members across party lines work together, because we do not see it often enough.

I know that the member for Vancouver East in the NDP is working with the Conservative and very hon. member for Wellington—Halton Hills. We are working together, as was the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, also a New Democrat, so I stand here today very pleased that we are going to see the bill pass into law, but I am increasingly unnerved by the number of groups that have approached all of us.

Certainly, as the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands, I have received numerous concerns from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, from the National Council of Canadian Muslims and from Democracy Watch, and their points are important. However, especially given the climate in which we find ourselves and the numerous delays in implementing changes to actually confront foreign interference, we have perhaps moved too quickly.

I am going to say for the record that I feel concerned that a number of these concerns are quite valid. For instance, when we consider that in subsection 20(3), the penalties for violating the act, and we still have to deal with the fact that there is some vagueness in how we are describing the offences, can amount to as much as imprisonment for life, these are very serious consequences and have a potential for a charter violation problem, as identified by some of the lawyers and legal organizations that have reviewed the bill and are asking whether it was wise to so infringe on the time in committee.

The hon. member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford mentioned some amendments that the NDP would have liked but the Bloc did not like, but that is how democracy works in committee. As Greens, we were given a very short window, so short that we were not able to submit amendments in time to even have them voted down, with the expedited fashion in which we have studied the bill.

I want to put on the record that we will continue to monitor it closely. There is an improvement, as mentioned, from the first reading version where the bill would have received parliamentary review five years after passage. It would now be much sooner. However, having made the decision that it was very important given the degree of efforts at foreign interference in this country, which are well documented, the expedited passage of the bill is important because we are increasingly aware of the threat.

I should pause to say we are increasingly aware of the threat because of some excellent work that has been done by colleagues from all parties in this place and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Their work is critical, and they have also been calling for measures such as those that are in Bill C-70.

As we go forward though in the development of regulations, and as the bill would be further implemented, let us be mindful that the bill has received precious little study. I think it is important to say that I do not think I have ever seen a bill with so many substantial changes to critical areas of law pass so very quickly as this one.

The concerns are also not just that the bill would have potentially charter-violating implications, as raised by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. I was also taken by the commentary from Democracy Watch that we have left too many loopholes. If we want to deal with foreign interference, why have we left it possible for such issues as a foreign agent's using lobbyists as proxies and slipping past some of the scrutiny that would apply in other contexts? There are a number of points that Democracy Watch has made in relation to loopholes that should be closed.

We are looking at concerns about the way in which the legislation would be rolled out. We do hope that it will receive royal assent and get through the Senate, but we have asked the Senate also to expedite it. Again, as much as I support implementing a foreign influence registry and keeping track of the activity of hostile governments, I am left disquieted by, and we must actually pay attention to, the fact that we have gone perhaps recklessly quickly in bringing the bill forward and getting it all the way through to third reading and over to the Senate.

That, I have to say, I am concerned about even though I had the ability to object, and one member's objecting ends unanimous consent. I did not want to take that step, but I want to put on the record that we are going to have to be very careful from here and take every opportunity to ensure that we are not violating charter rights and that we are not creating additional hazards for members of diaspora communities that we had not considered before we moved so very quickly.

Why are we concerned about foreign interference? Well, it is very clear that foreign interference, as in the case of the hon. member for Wellington—Halton Hills, has resulted in actual threats and intimidation of family members, things that any member of this place should not have to be concerned about as a Canadian citizen. Nor, for that matter, should a foreigner visiting our shores be concerned about them. We are not the only country, obviously, that is now recognizing that foreign governments interfere in our domestic affairs.

Recently, of course, reading over the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians put something back in mind. It was so long ago I had almost forgotten it, in 1983. It was European money that interfered in the Conservative Party leadership race in 1983, with Karlheinz Schreiber delivering a lot of cash to the anti-Joe Clark forces to secure a nomination more palatable to the forces from Europe providing that money, by nominating and electing Brian Mulroney as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party.

That was 40 years ago, and we still have not closed that loophole, even with the legislation before us. We need to pay a lot of attention to how foreign governments interfere in our affairs.

I take the point from the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford and wish to agree that it is one of the bill's strengths that it would be agnostic as to whether a foreign government is one we like or one we do not like. It is important to ensure that Canadian democracy for Canadians operates in the interests of Canadians. We will obviously have to take more steps going forward, but certain countries rise up in our concerns based on CSIS concerns, based on our intelligence operations. Those countries we know; they are named and they are understood by us as being interested in undermining Canadian democracy.

However, Canadian democracy is also undermined if we ignore our own values, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We must make sure that we have not gone too far with draconian measures in an effort to ensure that we control foreign interference.

I know this speech reflects my ambivalence, and for that I apologize. I know that I am very pleased that we would have a foreign influence registry. I would like to ensure that it would be effective but also would not accidentally trespass into areas that we would later regret.

I thank my colleagues for the time to address these issues with regard to Bill C-70.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to join my colleagues and share a few remarks on Bill C-70, a bill that I have become intimately familiar with over the last couple of weeks, given that I am a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Of course, that committee was seized with this bill last week, where we had meetings over four days, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of last week, with extended hours so that we could hear from witnesses, because of a programming motion from the House. I think that programming motion, and the fact that we have seen all parties in this place, usually a pretty partisan environment, put those differences aside to come together, I think underscores how important this legislation is and the realization from all political parties that this is a moment in time in Canadian history when we must meet the challenge united and with a clear purpose, because the threat is certainly there.

To put it into context, last week, of course, the report from NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, landed with the force of a bomb and, of course, has been dominating the news cycle ever since. I will not talk about the allegations toward members of Parliament in that report. I think the other parts of the report that are especially pertinent to tonight's debate are the fact that NSICOP has found, through its briefings with intelligence officials, that our intelligence community feels that our foreign adversaries regard Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” place in which to operate and pursue their strategic objectives. There are a number of reasons for this. That same report was also quite scathing of the Liberal government's response to the dire circumstances surrounding foreign interference: too little, too late.

That aside, we are at this moment and we do have Bill C-70 before us. It is important to understand that the bill has some pretty consequential amendments to existing statutes while also setting up a stand-alone law.

It is important to remember that when we are talking about foreign interference, it can be broadly separated into the interference or influence that we see publicly, coming not only from our adversaries but also from our allies, and the malicious and very pernicious aspect of foreign interference, which is the parts that happen in a clandestine way, the parts that are deceptive and underhanded, where adversaries are trying to use all tools at their disposal to influence how our democracy functions, sometimes to cause chaos, sometimes to pursue strategic objectives. It really depends on the circumstances and the country involved.

While we have had a slow response from the Liberal government, it is also very clear that our outdated national security laws are not up to the challenge of meeting that threat as they are currently written. I have used the phrase a couple of times over the last few days, as well as today, that essentially many of our laws were created in an analog era and that we need to bring them up to speed to meet the threat in what is a digital era. That is a big part of what Bill C-70 does.

What is in Bill C-70? The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with amendments to the CSIS Act. Many of those are in response to a pretty scathing report from NSIRA, which showed that CSIS has regularly broken its own statute's legislative guidelines in how it handles datasets. Again, when that law was crafted, back in 1984, the most advanced piece of technology in people's offices was probably a fax machine. We are a far cry from those days.

I think the other really consequential amendment to the CSIS Act is that it is now going to equip CSIS with the ability to share information with other interested parties, with parties that have a need to know some of this information. Under current laws, CSIS is very constrained in how it can share information. Again, if we are going to counter this threat with the seriousness it deserves, we need to equip our agencies with the tools that allow them to share this information.

Part 2 is also a very consequential update to the Security of Information Act. This part of the bill is really targeting the deceptive, clandestine nature of foreign interference. We all know that violations of any provision of the Security of Information Act come with hefty penalties, and in the bill before us, they are also there, because it underscores, again, how serious a nature these offences are. So, there are offences now for any foreign principals who are using violence, intimidation or threats to pursue strategic interests at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal, and there are hefty penalties going after anyone who is trying to influence governmental or legislative processes. Those are all spelled out in the Security of Information Act. Again, this is the part of the bill that is designed to go after the foreign interference that is not publicly known about, that is not going to be affected by the registry, which comes later on in the bill.

In part 4, there are also important updates to the Canada Evidence Act to really try to streamline the process. Evidence is often of a very sensitive nature and, again, we have heard a lot over the last two weeks of the gulf that exists between intelligence and evidence. However, when intelligence gets to a point where it can be used as evidence, we still need to handle it in a very secure way, and in a way that does not expose where our sources are, because, of course, that is of national interest to our country.

However, part 4, I think, is probably the part that has gotten the most attention in the bill. It would set up a registry so that we would have more accountability and transparency. It would be country agnostic, an important part to underline in this, so that even people who are working on the direction of, or in association with, friends and allies of Canada would still have to register if they are communicating with elected officials and if they are trying to influence some type of governmental process. It involves elected officials at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, and also with indigenous governments and organizations.

It is an important part, and I think the country agnostic feature of the bill is also important. Canadians definitely have an interest in how our adversaries are behaving here on Canadian soil. We would like to see those persons registered, but we might also have a very legitimate interest to see how our friends and allies are operating here on Canadian soil, because we would be deluding ourselves if we did not think that our friends and allies, in some way or another, are trying to influence how Canada makes its decisions, which has been a part of statecraft ever since there were states.

In the brief time that I have left, I realize that there still are concerns out there from some members of the community. I highlighted earlier the National Council of Canadian Muslims that has concerns about some of the aspects of the bill that are not very well defined. However, in my opinion, the bill does achieve a balancing act. Again, because of how dire the situation is with foreign interference, we need to meet this moment with a strong legislative response. I think that this is us, in the House of Commons, and later on in the Senate, but the Parliament of Canada as a whole, giving notice to our adversaries that their activities are now on our radar. We are aware of what they have been doing in Canada for quite some time now, and we are going to meet that challenge with a challenge of our own. This is really putting our cards on the table and showing people that we are serious about meeting this.

I am happy that there was a pretty collaborative effort at committee with amendments. The Bloc did not get all of the amendments that it wanted passed, neither did the NDP, but that is the way democracy works at committee. However, all in all, I am quite happy with the product that has been reported back to the House. I am glad to see that the House has come together to see the bill passed through by the end of tomorrow. I hope that the Senate will take the bill under way with the seriousness that it deserves.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I cannot begin my speech without thanking the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. Without him, many of these issues would not be on our radar. He led the way. I should also say, by the way, that he basically gave the speech I wanted to give.

Soon there will be a new law. We all agree that it was necessary. It is a good law. Is it a great law? I am not so sure. Is it excellent? I am really not sure. In other words, this is the kind of law I applaud, but with only one hand.

This was an intense exercise undertaken in a very short period of time. The process included reviews of a number of laws, including some that amend the Criminal Code. There is no doubt that the need to get the legislation in place before the next election sometimes took precedence over the desire for a more in-depth or thorough reflection. Decisions were made by reflex rather than reflection in this case. At the same time, we have to be careful, knowing that this is a very serious issue. We are not doing this just for the sake of doing it.

I will briefly sum up the bill because it amends four acts. Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act with respect to data collection. Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to add new criminal offences. Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act. Part 4 creates the foreign agent registry, to ensure transparency, of course.

Again, it is good legislation, but getting to this point has been tough. There have been several reports over the years. There was the Rosenberg report. There were CSIS alerts before that. Then there was the special rapporteur who claimed to be independent. Finally, there was the Hogue commission, which all four parties unanimously chose to engage with in order to shed light on this situation. Actually, it is more than a situation. It has become its own world.

What disappointed me when we got to that point was just seeing the culture of avoidance that is typical of the Liberal Party. If there is a problem, they close their eyes, turn away and pretend it is not there anymore. This culture of avoidance has caused major problems for us today, because while the Liberals were avoiding solving the problem, it was getting worse. Foreign interference is here today, it exists and it is still happening, even as we speak.

Still, there are elements to consider. Of course, the recent NSICOP report was a wake-up call for everyone. However, these revelations are the sum total of years' worth of observations. On April 30, the parties held a press conference, again nearly unanimously, with members of the diaspora here in the lobby of the House. On that occasion, I myself disclosed the fact that the Bloc Québécois was preparing a registry of foreign agents. Suddenly, as if by magic, Bill C-70 appeared. I think we kind of helped avoid the avoidance.

Still, when the bill was being studied, the Bloc Québécois had a few amendments to propose. There were not many, because, as I said before, the substance of the legislation is good. We presented a few points, four of which I am going to discuss here. The first had to do with what is known as two-party registration, meaning that both the foreign principal and the public office holder must register. That makes it possible to establish the relationship between the two. Obviously, if only the foreign principal registers, we have to take his or her word about who is at the other end. I do not think that is practical. I think the registry would have been simpler and more effective if it included two-party registration. Unfortunately, the public servants told us that it was a bit too complicated. However, we were studying the issue of foreign interference. To say that something is a bit too complicated is hardly an acceptable response. Considering the scope of the threat, I think that saying this would be too complicated is wrong.

We also wanted the legislation to apply to universities and Crown corporations. I must say that the universities were not enthusiastic about the idea. I think that certain foreign countries have a significant influence when it comes to research funding. Obviously, that amendment was not accepted. We also proposed a cooling-off period. The funny thing is that when we were discussing the amendment in question and the chair ruled it inadmissible, I could tell from the look on their faces that so many people were thinking about their post-election future. That made me smile.

I believe that a cooling-off period is part of the culture in the business world. These are people who do not give anything for nothing. It is smart to say that a foreign country may want to invest in someone as a public office holder, but they cannot be there for three years. I think that would have provided extra protection.

The crux of the matter is the independence of the commissioner. The commissioner will definitely be independent, but not entirely, and that is a problem. It is a problem that was raised by CSIS and several witnesses. During a study on interference at the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, several witnesses pointed out that if the commissioner is not independent, that is a problem. The commissioner will come under the Department of Public Safety. I am not suggesting that there was any bad faith, but I would have preferred the commissioner to be truly independent.

Whenever we talk about independence, I get the impression that the Liberal Party has a hard time with that term. I know that it is generally not fond of it. It had a hard time with the independent rapporteur. It had a hard time with the independent commissioner, too. As for Quebec's independence, we had better not discuss it. These amendments were rejected by the Liberals and the Conservatives. That bothers me a bit, because we had a common understanding of this bill. These four suggestions sought to amend and improve it.

However, we did manage to make one important improvement. The bill provided for a review of the act every five years, and we were able to change that to have the act reviewed one year after an election. When there is a minority government, like the one we have had for the past little while, there can be two or three elections in five years. We therefore had to move faster because the threat, like technology, is ahead of us. I think it would be rather foolish not to take note of the threat that is ahead of us.

One thing that is quite funny about the bill is that it is entitled the “Countering Foreign Interference Act”, but it does not define foreign interference. What is foreign interference? It is when one nation interferes in the affairs of another nation. It is as simple as that.

It would have taken courage to accept the suggestions I put forward earlier. I was told that it was complicated, expensive, and many other things. That said, let us not forget that interference costs us billions of dollars a year. Courage can be a real issue at times. I am not saying there was no courage in this case, just not enough. That is not the same thing. “Reason and respect make livers pale and lustihood deject”, as Shakespeare wrote in Troilus and Cressida. I think we would do well to take a lesson in courage from some of our predecessors.

There is no definition of foreign interference in the bill. In my opinion, we have to name it, or it does not exist. Naming it gives it meaning.

In the same vein, I want to touch on the motion that was adopted yesterday, almost unanimously. The Bloc Québécois motion asked Commissioner Hogue to look into the recent revelations in the NSICOP report.

We cannot dissociate these two elements because we are talking about foreign interference in both cases. I was pleased to see that, in light of this major threat, the House showed a lot of courage and decided to grab the bull by the horns, tackle the problem head-on and move forward.

In this case, I think that the decision made by the House yesterday was an honourable one. Unfortunately, Bill C-70 is somewhat lacking in ambition, and I am worried that that will come back to haunt us later.

Finally, there is the matter of overclassification. In the Winnipeg lab case, we saw that the redactions could have been reversed on many elements without harming national security. I always struggle with knowing that documents may have been overclassified.

I can say right away that the Bloc Québécois will support Bill C‑70. We will support it, but we will applaud it with only one hand, because it is not great, but it is better than nothing.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Madam Speaker, now that Bill C-70 is back in the House for third reading, I would like to take this opportunity to outline the long journey it took to get to this point.

In 2018, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, advised the government about threats presented by the People's Republic of China. That year, he warned the Prime Minister that PRC activities related to the threat of foreign interference were an existential threat for Parliament and the elections.

Also in 2018, the government was advised that the measures then in place were not sufficient to counter these threats to Parliament and to our elections. We know that because it was the second finding of fact on page 73 of the NSICOP report.

Also back in 2018, national security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including new legislation.

It is also notable that in 2018, the CSIS director also advised the government of another threat from the PRC, which was the threat of espionage. We know that because, for the first time ever, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service gave a public speech in December of that year. In that speech, he warned of serious threats from the PRC closely related to foreign interference, which were those of espionage. These threats came in the form of espionage targeting Canadian companies and Canadian universities in the five sensitive areas he outlined at that time: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G telecommunications technology, biopharma and clean tech.

Subsequently, in 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister's approval for an action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. The Prime Minister did not approve that plan.

Again, a year later, in December 2020, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister sought the Prime Minister's approval again for that action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. Again, the Prime Minister did not approve the plan.

For the third time, in February 2022, the national security and intelligence adviser resurrected this initiative, and again, the Prime Minister did not approve an action plan.

In all three occasions over several years, the Prime Minister did not approve actions that would have protected Parliament and our elections.

On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to produce a robust plan to counter foreign interference threat activities here on Canadian soil. Despite all of this advice, despite the call of the House of Commons to the government to enact a robust plan to counter foreign interference and to take additional measures to protect Canadian democracy, little was done.

Then, because the Prime Minister did not approve actions to protect Parliament and our elections, and because the government failed to heed the call of the House in the motion adopted on November 18, 2020, foreign interference threats increased from 2018 to present.

As Justice Hogue said in her initial report of May 3, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.

Then, subsequent to all of this, in the fall of 2022, explosive media reports about foreign interference threats broke. These reports raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew, when he knew it and why he did not act on the intelligence and the advice he was given by the senior civil service. Further explosive revelations in the subsequent months followed in the media. Finally, on March 6, 2023, the government promised to look at introducing measures in law to counter these threats.

It took years for the government to take the advice of CSIS, the senior civil service and countless reports. It took years for the government to introduce legislation. Finally, after much urging, many controversies and a lot of work done by a great many people, the government reluctantly introduced Bill C‑70.

That brings us to the debate today on Bill C-70 at third reading. Bill C-70 is a much-needed response to the existential threat to our democracy from foreign interference. It would modernize the CSIS Act, allowing CSIS to better obtain preservation and production orders, and national security warrants for obtaining information, records or documents, through a single attempt. It would better allow CSIS to collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. It would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence and to disclose classified information outside of the Government of Canada to provinces, municipalities, universities, companies and individuals being targeted.

It would create new criminal offences for those who would engage in foreign interference here in Canada on behalf of a foreign state, ensuring that we could better protect Canadians against these corrosive, clandestine, corrupting and coercive activities, especially Canadians in diaspora communities who have suffered for so long in silence and isolation. It would also make it easier to prosecute these offences by removing the requirement to prove harm to the interests of Canada when a Canadian is targeted by foreign interference.

It would create a new criminal offence that would better protect essential infrastructure in Canada, including stiff penalties for those who would sabotage essential infrastructure on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign government. It would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential to other acts so that it would allow information relating to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings to be better handled.

Finally, the bill would establish a foreign influence, transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals in Canada engaged in legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal.

The bill was strengthened in committee, particularly with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with leaders in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and after resolutions in the House of Commons and in the Senate are adopted. This would ensure that while the commissioner is situated within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, within the machinery of government, the commissioner would have a degree of independence to manage and to interpret the act, to issue notices of compliance, to issue administrative monetary penalties and to refer matters to law enforcement for criminal prosecution.

Time is of the essence. We must ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of foreign interference. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted in her initial report, the risk of the impacts from foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. She also concluded that “foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 [general] elections” undermined “public confidence in Canada's democracy”.

As the general election draws closer, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections. Time is running out to combat the rising threat of foreign interference. Canadians need to be able to go to the polls in the next election and to be confident not only in the integrity of the overall election but also in the integrity of each of the elections that take place in each of the 338 electoral districts in Canada. This bill must pass, and I encourage all of my parliamentary colleagues, in this place and in the other place, to support this bill and to see its adoption into law before we adjourn for the summer.