Canada-China Relations Committee on June 3rd, 2024

[Prof. Alice Ba]

That's a great question.

Japan is a very interesting partner for the United States as well as for the ASEAN states. Part of Japan's advantage, so to speak, and this is where it has a different advantage compared to other states, is the economics. Think about Japan's presence in Southeast Asia. Early on it was very prominent, beginning in the late 1970s, 1980s. That's a long history as well. Japan, of course, being constitutionally constrained historically since the end of World War II, has also emphasized other tools of engagement. It's diplomatic, and it's also economic.

In terms of how it's influenced, if you think about it, whether it is governmental or non-governmental linkages and feedback, Japan has used its close relationship with the United States to channel some of those ideas back. One good example is the Quad. The Quad has gone through several iterations. The latest iteration has a lot of content that ASEAN can get on board with. ASEAN was extremely concerned when the Quad was first rejuvenated, but under the current iteration, which emphasizes non-traditional security and economics and has become less militarized, the Quad has become much more acceptable. That's different from AUKUS, and that, again, I would argue was something that Japan had no small part in doing.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I'm sorry, Mr. Chong, but your time is up.

We'll go to Ms. Yip now for five minutes, please.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you to the witnesses for staying so late. I'd like to hear from each of the witnesses on this question.

With China seemingly being the predominant influence in Southeast Asia, is there room for other countries? How do the countries in Southeast Asia navigate between China and the U.S.?

Professor Ostwald, would you like to start?

[Kai Ostwald]

Thanks.

I'll start with that and give a very brief response.

I think it's precisely because China is such a large force in Southeast Asia that there is room for other countries. China is viewed uniformly as the engine of economic growth for the region, or at least as one of the key engines, but there is also deep concern about overreliance on China and the vulnerability that brings. As China has become more assertive and as China has played a larger role, there's been more and more appetite for engaging beyond China.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Professor Ba, how do these countries navigate between China and the U.S.?

[Prof. Alice Ba]

How they navigate is there's a careful choreography, and some have noted that, on the parts of individual states as well as ASEAN itself.

China is a fact of life. I would argue that most states, despite all sorts of questions about China, both strategically and economically, actually expect China to remain a very important partner to them. How they navigate that is by balancing that out with other partners. One good example is the strategic partnership. We've been talking about this with respect to Canada, but we can talk about it with respect to the upgrading of a China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership. China wanted to do it earlier. ASEAN states held back until Australia was ready to get on board, so that China wasn't special.

You see this in some other areas as well, in economics as well as a kind of strategic confidence building. You see this kind of choreography to make sure that China understands it is not the only one.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Stephens, do you have any comments?

[Hugh Stephens]

Yes. I agree with all of the above. I would also note that ASEAN has been very careful to ensure that there are various players. If you look at investment, Japanese investment has been extremely important in countries like Vietnam, Thailand and, of course, Singapore. Korean investment has been very important in Vietnam. While the two polarities are China and the U.S., and they try to keep on good terms with both—the U.S. is a very important economic partner, but of course it also plays a strategic role, as does China—ASEAN has tried to keep its options open.

I would add in one more player, and that's relations with the EU. They're open towards relations and building relations with the EU. Then, if you want to bring in, perhaps, some of the more—maybe minor is not the word—smaller countries like Canada and Australia, they develop their own relations as well. They've been very effective in building these dialogues, the annual meetings and so on, as a way of making sure that, in a sense, they're diluting that rivalry by adding more countries to it and making sure they are the convenor.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Stephens, you mentioned in your opening statements a tech war between China and the U.S. Where does Canada stand? Can we capitalize on any opportunities?

[Hugh Stephens]

As I mentioned, our room for manoeuvre is relatively limited, certainly in terms of the fact that we're part of an integrated North American market, so the U.S. is going to be looking very carefully to make sure we're not a conduit or a back door that would undermine their situation. On the other hand, Canada does have specific assets in the area of AI, digital technology and so on. I'm not steering it away from China. I think there are opportunities in Southeast Asia for Canada to develop that, even, indeed, with regard to Taiwan and its supply chains, but we have to be realistic. There's not going to be a big gap or much of a gap between Canada and the U.S. when it comes to this. That said, I don't see that Canada needs to be in the forefront of these blockages or regulations that have been put in place to divert or, in fact, even to cut off Chinese access to certain technologies, but I do think we have to recognize our role as part of a North American supply chain.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Yip.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for two and a half minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We had an absolutely fascinating discussion a few moments ago on AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. I'd like all three of you to comment on this.

If Canada were to join AUKUS, would it hurt its relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries, while at the same time promoting even closer relations with the countries that are part of AUKUS?

What would most favour Canada in terms of strategic advantages, joining AUKUS or maintaining the status quo?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

To which witness are you directing your question, Mr. Bergeron?

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I'd like Mr. Stephens to start.

[Hugh Stephens]

AUKUS is evolving, so the original conception of AUKUS as focused largely on nuclear submarine technology is changing as we speak. There's now general talk about, perhaps, an associate membership in AUKUS—Japan has been mooted as a member; Canada is a possible member—and looking at other areas of sharing of technology.

I think Canada needs to keep an open mind and find where it could find a role. The role it would play, I think, would be a very different role from those of Australia and the United States. I think there's a potential for us to be associated with AUKUS and to derive some benefits from it and not have it threaten or undermine our relationships in the region.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Professor Ba, what do you think?

[Prof. Alice Ba]

Personally, I don't think that policy should be led with AUKUS. Again, if we look at the other partners that we've just mentioned, they have established themselves as much more durable presences economically, diplomatically and strategically in the region. AUKUS, as Mr. Stephens said, is evolving, although I would argue that it is still considered, in Southeast Asia, as quite a militarized entity. There are challenges there. I believe that Canada is not served by allowing AUKUS policy to lead Southeast Asia policy.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

We'll go to Professor Ostwald for a short comment, please.

[Kai Ostwald]

Very briefly, I'll add that if the original conception were to be the model, it makes little sense. It's extraordinarily expensive. I think Australia itself is coming to terms with how viable it is.

If it evolves into something else and we're talking about new channels for shared technology, for intelligence, then possibly, but the question is what that is.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

Ms. McPherson, you have two and a half minutes, please.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to start, Mr. Ostwald, by allowing you to.... We didn't get back to you on that last question.

[Kai Ostwald]

Thanks.

I'll be very brief and say that I think Japan is a very good example. I'll also add that there is a lot of memory of Canada in Southeast Asia as playing the role of a middle power. Canada was an active mediator in the South China Sea in the 1990s. Of course, during the Indochina wars, Canada was active in a mediator role. That legacy is there, and I think it's something that Canada can try to reclaim.

As was noted, it's not an either-or: an aide-de-camp to the United States or a middle power independent of the United States. Balancing between those two positions is difficult. There is a lot of attention being paid in Southeast Asia to what Canada is doing and which direction it's tending towards.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I will follow up with Mr. Stephens.

You spoke about how there is the impression that Canada sometimes is seen as the “deputy sheriff”. I think that was the way you phrased it. How would we best change that? What would be the best route for us to differentiate ourselves?

Frankly, our foreign policies have.... Historically, Canada has had some bravery in having foreign policy that is not aligned with that of the U.S. It doesn't seem to be the case anymore, but I'm wondering what you would recommend in that circumstance.

[Hugh Stephens]

I think the IPS is a good example of what we can do. I think we need to work on areas where Canada can make a positive development, can make a positive contribution, and build our own bilateral linkages, whether they're these people-to-people linkages or institutional linkages. The IPS identifies a number of areas where we can make a contribution, whether it's in disaster mitigation—