National Defence Committee on June 3rd, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ladies and gentlemen, let's get started. I see quorum, and I'm sure it's 11:00 somewhere.

We have, in our final hour on the study we adopted concerning the defence of space, two witnesses. We have Dr. James Fergusson, senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, department of political studies, University of Manitoba. By video conference, we have Dr. Jessica West, senior researcher at Project Ploughshares.

I think coming in virtually is a bit of a disadvantage, so I'm going to ask Dr. West if she would lead off with a five-minute opening statement. Then I'll turn to Dr. Fergusson.

With that, Dr. West, you have five minutes.

[Jessica West, Senior Researcher, Project Ploughshares]

Thank you so much for having me here today to speak about the critical issue of space defence from a Canadian perspective.

As you have already heard from Brigadier-General Adamson, the Canadian military and indeed all Canadians across the country are deeply dependent on the countless capabilities that outer space provides. The nature and scope of potential threats to these capabilities are both diverse and growing. For these reasons, the 3 Canadian Space Division is tasked with defending and protecting satellites, but it is not clear what this looks like in practice. In this context, my remarks will focus on the need to avoid an overly militarized and weaponized response to defence challenges in outer space.

This concern does not negate the legitimate interests of the Canadian Armed Forces in outer space nor their role in safeguarding the ability of all Canadians to maintain the many benefits that we derive from space-based capabilities. However, a focus on defence must include efforts to prevent escalation of conflict and arms racing in outer space, and here's why.

First, the outer space environment is unique. Although increasingly referred to as a war-fighting domain like any other, outer space is fundamentally different from terrestrial domains. There is no distinct military zone or battlefield in outer space. It is a shared environment used by military, commercial and civilian entities from all around the world. War in space would have catastrophic ripple effects on all of these users, potentially disrupting the interconnected systems that underpin daily life around the world.

Such conflict risks long-lasting contamination of an already fragile outer space environment. Objects in space move at incredible speeds, meaning that debris from kinetic impacts spread through the orbital environment, posing threats for generations. When considering defence in this environment, space itself is often not the best vantage point for thinking about either offensive or defensive capabilities. Instead, the answers are often to be found through responses on the ground and other domains.

Second, the operating environment in outer space is the greatest source of insecurity. This environment is far away from earth, which makes the ability to detect and identify harmful capabilities or activities and differentiate them from the effects of natural hazards such as debris and space weather.... This issue is exacerbated by a lack of political transparency and the dual-use nature of space technology, which can serve both benign and harmful purposes. The integration of commercial activities further blurs the lines. From a defence perspective, these sources of uncertainty increase the risk of misperception and unintended conflict.

Investment in capabilities for detection, resiliency and redundancy through collaboration with allies is important, but so too is awareness that such efforts often inspire adversaries to develop countermeasures, potentially accelerating arms racing dynamics. It is thus imperative that they be developed alongside efforts to contribute greater collective clarity and stability in the space environment.

Finally, good defence requires good governance. Militarized and inflammatory responses to perceived threats are propelling an arms race and risk geopolitical confrontation. Canada must resist such trends. Defence in outer space should not rely on tit-for-tat reactions to perceived insecurities or possible weapon systems.

Canada has a long-standing commitment to the international goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, or PAROS. Recently, this commitment has been supported through efforts to develop norms of responsible behaviour as a means of mitigating the current environment of insecurity and mistrust. The development of norms requires countries to lead by example to demonstrate the principles, values and behaviours that we promote. This includes upholding key tenets of the outer space treaty such as the non-contamination of the space environment and maintaining its peaceful nature. Defence activities are a key part of this effort.

Avoiding armed conflict is essential to protecting the environment, to safeguarding civilians and to ensuring that outer space remains a domain of peaceful co-operation. By focusing on good international collaboration and multidomain responses, Canada can help foster a secure and sustainable future in space.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. West.

Dr. Fergusson, you have five minutes.

[Dr. James Fergusson, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Good morning.

A 1998 U.S. war game was stopped when the red team, Russia, facing catastrophic defeat, launched a coordinated nuclear strike against space assets. Space, for all intents and purposes, was functionally destroyed. As a result, the U.S. blue team military forces, dependent upon space, ground to a halt. It was further estimated that the attack would have resulted in an estimated 20-year global recession. The results would subsequently inform the congressionally mandated commission on space study, the Rumsfeld report, which warned of a future Pearl Harbor in space.

The probability of such an attack is relatively low, even in the case of a major war between the great powers of space-dependent states. Even so, the likelihood that limited strikes against space assets, whether in an attempt to disrupt or degrade electronic signals or to physically strike satellites, is relatively high. At the same time, the ability to defend space-based capabilities for national defence and economic reasons is extremely difficult but essential.

In no particular order, there are numerous answers and options available for the defence of access to space. The first, ironically, is not to defend per se, but to deter, which in turn can be assessed in two basic forms. One is existential in nature. Assuming that all states to a conflict are dependent upon space capabilities, all will be deterred from striking space capabilities. Common interests here set the foundation for an expansion of the existing space legal regime, centred on the outer space treaty. Problematic, however, is the fear of defection and cheating.

This fear underpins the other deterrence option, which implicitly coexists with the first. This is the threat to retaliate against an adversary who attacks our space capabilities by explicitly threatening their own space capabilities or other high-value assets.

Even with these in place, a state has incentives to develop capabilities as insurance against deterrence failure. Among these are redundancy and reconstitution. The former entails non-space backup systems capable of mitigating against the loss of space capabilities. The latter is the possession of a strategic reserve of space capabilities—satellites—that can be rapidly launched to replace lost capabilities.

With regard to satellite on-orbit measures, the first step is space domain awareness. Here the problem is not knowing what is on-orbit per se, but what the purpose is. Civil and commercial space capabilities are relatively easy to discern, as are many military dedicated satellites. However, satellites, which are nationally flagged, may possess other functions that may be dormant, and, as with national civil air and maritime assets, can be mobilized during a time of crisis or war. This is the dual-use problem, in which military space capabilities and employment are much greater than the sum of dedicated military space capabilities. This reality provides on-orbit redundancy in which satellites can perform different functions, including replacing a destroyed satellite, although it also complicates significantly understanding intent and purpose.

It is also useful to differentiate among threats to space capabilities. The first is directly to the ground stations. The second is to electronic signals transmitted to and from satellites. Satellite signals are encrypted, although the extent to which existing encryption is sufficient to protect against disruption or degradation varies widely. Here resides the space version of the cybersecurity problem. As with this problem on earth, the problem of attribution and intent of electronic or cyber-attacks on satellites exists, even in peacetime.

All satellites are hardened to some degree to protect against the harsh environment of space. Hardening, however, beyond environmental protection to include defence against a nuclear strike is extremely costly relative to launch weight and the tight economic margins of commercial space, at least for now.

The second is direct threats to satellites and the capacity to manoeuvre out of harm's way, which has grown immensely over the last decades. However, this option is a double-edged sword. The capability to manoeuvre also enables the employment of a satellite as an anti-satellite weapon. The same applies to emerging on-orbit servicing satellites with robotic arms, of which the Canadarm on the space shuttle was the first example.

Canada, in terms of space defence, sits on the margins, notwithstanding a comparatively small but advanced space technology industry. Importantly, given the dual-use nature of, for example, the RADARSAT Constellation and planned military space investments identified around NORAD modernization, space defence must be carefully assessed alone and in conjunction with allies.

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. Fergusson and Dr. West.

This begins our six-minute round. We have Mr. Bezan, Mr. Fillmore, Madame Normandin and Ms. Mathyssen.

Mr. Bezan, you have six minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today.

Dr. Fergusson, I appreciate you painting the picture of what's at risk here knowing that the weaponization of space continues to accelerate.

Can you talk about the impact on NORAD operations if there was a nuclear attack in space against joint satellites that are controlled by Canada and the United States to support our defence and deterrence measures?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

The major impact is that NORAD would go blind.

NORAD depends on elements of the U.S. space surveillance network, to which we contribute one satellite. It contains access to information from the defence support program, which has infrared satellites in both geosynchronous and polar orbits that can identify all rocket or missile launches. That's followed by the ground-based ballistic missile early warning network, which is cued from the DSP. Taking out the DSP is a dangerous thing to do in other strategic considerations.

Basically, NORAD would be unable to see. It would be very difficult, if not highly improbable, for it to undertake its primary mission of aerospace warning, that is, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, in which they notify national command authorities if the United States and Canada are under attack and what the nature of that attack is.

It would be catastrophic.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

When you expand that, we're already running blind in our ability to push out the horizon so we can see things. Would the advent of the new over-the-horizon radar system be impacted, in your estimation? I know it's not up and running yet, but it's ground-based.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

You could threaten the ground-based over-the-horizon radars, but the loss of space entirely would not have a major effect on them because they're primarily interested in air-breathing threats. You have, on the margin, the question of hypersonics, which fly at roughly 50 kilometres an hour in what I call suborbital space—at high speeds. It's unclear to me whether the over-the-horizon system—and it would need to be cued to look at things—would be significantly affected. It's unclear whether the over-the-horizon radar can actually look.

The other thing I would add is that the United States has deployed an infrared system in low-earth orbit to deal with the problem of ballistic missile defence and, I suspect, the problem of hypersonic vehicles. That's another degree of redundancy for the American space surveillance system.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Aside from those assets, what else do we need to do, from a Canadian perspective, to augment what's happening in the United States under NORAD for better space deterrence?

A comment came up about an arms race in space. The Russians are putting nuclear weapons in space. The PRC has now landed on the far side of the moon. What does Canada need to be doing to more greatly enhance our ability to deter and defend North America?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I think a few things are important. One is the next step that's being taken, which is adding a satellite to the Sapphire—the Sapphire 2 we could call it—for deep space surveillance, although it's primarily to surveil the vital geosynchronous orbit.

There has been some discussion, which would also be a good step, of going back to what we used to have in the sixties until the eighties. That would be two optical ground stations to facilitate the surveillance of space. There's no clear indication that this will proceed, but those would assist us.

In the context of NORAD, it's unclear to me what Canada could or could not do. It can do lots of things, but in terms of the surveillance of space, the key thing to know when space is under attack is what we might contribute to surveillance from space—the DSP system. That's to ensure there's enough redundancy, because that is key to being able to identify launches. Once you identify launches, you can quickly calculate where they're going—whether they're going into orbit or not or the orbital path they're going to take—and whether they're using a type of ballistic missile, such as a fractional orbital bombardment system with a depressed trajectory that needs to be tracked.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

The depressed trajectory is different from high orbit, which is what BMD was built around. We're now looking at hypersonics that come in low and fast, but are still intercontinental.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Yes, intercontinental ballistic missiles have a very high trajectory. They cut through low-earth orbit before they descend to earth. The depressed trajectory of a fractional orbital bombardment system is much flatter. A missile goes through the lower reaches of low-earth orbit before it reaches the target, so it partially enters into orbit before it descends on its target.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

When we are looking at everything through a Canadian lens—we have a space command under the CAF—what type of investments do you recommend the Canadian Armed Forces should be making in our space command?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

The planned investments announced in 2022 and then reiterated in the defence policy update are a good step forward for a major contribution, particularly the defence enhanced surveillance from space project, which will be a military-dedicated RADARSAT capability. It will provide value for the defence of North America, as well as global value because of the nature of its orbital paths.

It's not that I think we can do much more than has already been planned. My concern is more about whether we will actually do it and about the commitments we make to allies about it.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Bezan.

Mr. Fillmore, you have six minutes.

[Andy Fillmore, Liberal, Halifax, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Many thanks to today's witnesses. It's wonderful to see you both here.

I'd like to direct my questions to Ms. West of Project Ploughshares.

Ms. West, we understand the mission of Project Ploughshares. You're interested in researching peace and how to maintain it. In your research on space and space defence, are you working with other NGOs and United Nations bodies that are focused on space security and defence, and if so, how do you work with them?

[Jessica West]

That's a wonderful question. Thank you, Mr. Fillmore.

I work extensively with other NGOs and with the Canadian Department of National Defence, where I've done research on how we can contribute to the development of norms of responsible behaviour, as well as future arms-control mechanisms and diplomatic initiatives, which is a whole-of-government effort.

I work extensively with Secure World Foundation on joint projects that are mostly related to norms and prevention of an arms race in outer space. I have participated extensively at the open-ended working group on the development of norms of responsible behaviour at the United Nations. I've also spoken informally—because that's all Russia allowed—to the group of governmental experts focused on new legal arrangements. My remarks have been focused on the development of transparency and communications measures that can help advance some of the efforts to get at new rules and demystify some of what's happening in orbit.

I've also been involved in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, with sponsorship from the Canadian government, to present the work that we have done over the years related to space security and how we know if space is secure or insecure, with security meaning the sustainability of the environment, the safety of operations and the security of assets in space and on the ground.

[Andy Fillmore, Liberal, Halifax, NS]

Is there any work you're undertaking that gets to the emerging impact of AI, other emerging technologies and cyber-connectivity that you would like to make the committee aware of with regard to space security?

[Jessica West]

I have a colleague at Project Ploughshares, Branka Marijan, who does excellent work on AI. I've been involved through the Centre for International Governance Innovation on examining the space-cyber nexus, and I've been the editor of a series of essays.

I think it is really important to understand that outer space is intermingled with all kinds of emerging technology. That includes cyber, AI, quantum encryption, and quantum decryption in the future. Being able to tease out the impacts that these different technologies have I think is going to be important.

A key message I have is that it's going to make conflict escalation more probable and more difficult to prevent, especially if we don't work on better communication and transparency practices, simply because things are going to start moving faster. Decision-making is going to move faster, and windows for de-escalation, for communicating and for clarifying intentions and activities might become much smaller. That's going to be problematic if we don't have good communication channels already in place with adversaries. We don't have good hotlines in place to try to clarify activities in orbit, which are necessary to interpret whether or not something is harmful, and to communicate our own senses of insecurity with regard to certain activities.

We also don't have great mechanisms for sharing a lot of the fantastic orbital information that we have in outer space beyond immediate allies, and I think that's really important for avoiding the tit-for-tat accusations that happen. As mentioned, there are concerns that Russia might be developing nuclear capabilities in space. It's hard to share information on that because it's intelligence and it's secret.

We also see accusations that come the other way, particularly from China and Russia. They accuse capabilities such as the U.S. mission extension vehicle, which is a satellite servicing capability, of being weapons. Without having information that can be accessed more broadly by the broader international community, it can be hard to differentiate these tit-for-tat accusations and know which ones are legitimate and which ones are not.

[Andy Fillmore, Liberal, Halifax, NS]

I have a minute and a half left.

Communications, obviously, become a very important matter in maintaining security in space, and you identified some challenges when you made comments about Russia. Regarding the importance of having a good communications protocol, is there anything more you can tell us to characterize your conversations with Russia? What were they willing to share, or what did you divine is their interest or footing in this subject?

[Jessica West]

Russia is not willing to share anything, really. Neither Russia nor China provides very much public access to any information it holds.

What are their intentions? The reason I emphasized avoiding heavily militarized or provocative responses is that from my perspective, Russia and China are both trying hard to depict the west as weaponizing outer space, and I see some of the responses that are pursued as playing into that hand.

Globally, it is essential at the United Nations that space remains peaceful. That is a fundamental goal of that body and of many state participants, and the perspective that there are active efforts in the west to weaponize space is driving a lot of conversation and competition among allies, diplomatic allies in particular, regarding some of these issues.

My perspective is that it's not clear what states are doing. It's clear that a lot of capabilities are being developed and technologies are being tested. It is not at all clear what the intentions are behind them and which ones will actually be developed, deployed and put into orbit, if any. That includes the intelligence on nuclear, as well as other potential kinetic capabilities.

Given that lack of clarity, we need to exercise leadership in trying to lower the volume.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Fillmore.

For the benefit of witnesses, there's a high probability that Madame Normandin will speak in French, so if you switch to the French channel, that will be good.

Ms. Normandin for six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Chair, you seem to know me quite well.

I'd like to start by asking Ms. West a question.

You're saying that countries must lead by example to manage airspace; however, unfortunately, we know that not all countries respect the rule of law. I'd like to draw a parallel, for example, with nuclear deterrence. We'd all like to be able to achieve nuclear disarmament, but many voices point out that dissuasion is still necessary, given the context.

I'd like your opinion on the space issue. Do you believe that dissuasion is important? If so, what does that look like?

[Jessica West]

Absolutely, and I'm leading by example. I want to point out that Canada was the first country to join the U.S.-led moratorium on destructive tests of anti-satellite weapons in space, so I think we're doing a good job on this.

I think dissuasion is a wonderful word. It's slightly different from deterrence. It brings in more political tools, to my mind, so thank you for that question.

I think resiliency and redundancy are really valuable for dissuasion. If you can reduce the value of a target and the impact that disrupting a specific capability would have, you dissuade targeting that capability. I think we're seeing the effect of that already with the gradual transition towards distributed space architecture and large constellations of satellites, where the capability of the system is distributed across many different objects in space and not concentrated in one. That also applies to distributed ground station architectures so you don't have one critical point or node in a space system.

I think we are seeing the value of that. Even if we talk about the potential fear that has been raised over nuclear weapons in space, it's aimed at the perception of an invulnerability being developed through resilience. That's why I think these capabilities go hand in hand with the diplomatic side. Canada's Department of National Defence has been a great participant, alongside Global Affairs, on the development of norms in outer space. I think we should continue along that trajectory.

I'm not sure how dissuasive weapons would be in outer space. It's a really bizarre environment where things are moving at incredible speeds. Orbital manoeuvres are not straightforward. I think there's a lot of opportunity for misperception, accidents and activities that can have a long-lasting detrimental effect on everybody in outer space, so the focus on having different systems on earth is valuable.