National Defence Committee on June 3rd, 2024

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Perhaps something is lost in translation from French. The words “dissuasion” and “deterrence” have the same meaning.

I'd like you to tell me whether, in your opinion, deterrence is necessary.

I'd also like your opinion, Mr. Fergusson. In your opening remarks, you talked about deterrence. I'd like to ask you the same question: Are deterrents necessary in space and what does that look like?

The question is for both witnesses.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Many of the points that my colleague answered I would agree with entirely. Redundancy and reconstitution are very vital, but the key thing to me about deterrence is the issue of the threat that the west—the United States—is going to make. Let's be blunt about it: This is about the United States; it's not about Canada. Yes, we signed on to the moratorium, but, of course, it was cost-free because we weren't going to do that anyway. It's virtual signalling by the government.

The key things are how and on what conditions you threaten your adversary to change their calculations. It's been a long debate within the deterrence literature that goes back to the 1950s. You might try to create a clear, certain environment by saying, “If you do A, we will do B, and we have the ability to do it”. Hence, our adversary knows exactly what's going to happen. Others say that it's better to leave it as uncertain. Vague is the way you need to deal with this, and it will affect the calculation of the adversary differently.

The problem is particularly when we get away from the physical side. Interestingly, when we talk about physical destruction and the orbit destruction of satellites, we talk about killing them with anti-satellite weapons when the real, bigger threat—and it's still a major threat—is the signals themselves. How do you protect them? When there are circumstances, what do you threaten to deter adversaries from going after them, degrading the signals, capturing a satellite through cyber-attack—all those types of things? That's extremely difficult, because no government has made clear, with satellites nationally flagged and particularly dedicated military satellites, under what circumstances this would be considered an act of war. That's in a very grey zone. For credible deterrence on the part of the west—the United States—they need to come to some clear understanding and ability to communicate, at least tacitly, with the Chinese, the Russians and India. We're not trying to deter India, but India has to be brought into this equation because it is a major space player.

That's the way I think we need to strengthen our deterrence capability. We already have the intercept capabilities; those already exist. Even though we talk about weaponizing in orbit, they all exist. Missile defence capabilities, ICBMs and SLBMs can all strike at space assets. They just have to be programmed differently.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Normandin.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have six minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. West, I'm interested in continuing with you. I really appreciate you coming to this committee to talk to us about the importance of the diplomatic work that's necessary.

This was just stated by the other witness, and I certainly appreciate the perspective: How do you threaten your adversary to deter their actions? This is something the world has seen time and time again, so I'd like your perspective on it. It seems to me that we keep doing the same old thing over and over again and it continues to get us into a bigger and bigger mess.

Could I have your perspective on that? Where do you see a balance between the threatening of adversaries and the open communications that you were talking about?

[Jessica West]

I agree that it tends to lead to a bigger and bigger mess down the line, because states respond in turn and you have an escalation of threat.

Deterrence is hard in space. NATO is currently undergoing, I believe under Canadian leadership, a study of defence in outer space. My input on that process is that it's not working very well, precisely because of a lot of the factors that Dr. Fergusson raised. We're not just talking about one kind of action that you're trying to deter in outer space. There are many different ways of interfering with space systems. They can target satellites, they can target the communication links or they can target ground stations and the computer systems, so trying to deter everything is difficult.

I think we need to be very careful about the priorities for deterrence, focusing on command and control of military capabilities, nuclear systems and kinetic attacks. They lead to long-lasting environmental devastation, which is in no one's interest. We also have to not just think about the threat side of that. I appreciate that Dr. Fergusson raised those two approaches—very specific or very vague. Right now, it's leaning towards the very vague. We will respond in any domain and at any time of our choosing, so it's not clear what's going to happen if something happens to our capabilities in outer space.

I will note, however, that the United States and Russia have both linked interference with certain critical space systems to extended nuclear deterrence, so they have raised the prospect that they would respond with nuclear weapons. I think that's dangerous, and it points to the risk of escalation in outer space, which can escalate way beyond the space environment back down to earth and all the way to nuclear weapons.

I think if we're trying to become less vulnerable, invulnerability is not possible, but we can reduce vulnerabilities through having redundant capabilities on earth and in space. They can include having interoperability with allies so that if systems go down you can use something else and having architectures in space that are distributed and difficult to disrupt. Those are absolutely essential, not only because they can withstand some of the escalatory challenges that can come with deterrence, but also because they help provide protection against natural threats in the space environment, which are also significant. We had wonderful solar storms. I'm hoping some of you saw the northern lights or the auroras from the storm we had, but there were effects on GPS.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

I think they're coming again.

[Jessica West]

They are, and they have an impact on space systems and earth. Investments in these kinds of resilient physical capabilities can also aid with protection against the natural threats we face.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

The sharing of those technologies would be such an incredible signal for open communication and peace building.

[Jessica West]

Yes, and we are doing a good job on a lot of this. I actually don't have a lot of qualms about Canada in space. I know there's probably a desire for more funding, for more capability and for doing what we've committed to do, but I think Canada has been doing quite well with what we have and with our priorities.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

I want to to shift a bit. We've talked a lot in this committee about the privatization of space. I have a significant concern—and I know many have a significant concern too—with, as an example, Elon Musk already having one of the largest single satellite consultation companies. It is now signing really significant contracts with the Americans, and we saw his role with Russia and Ukraine in that regard.

What does that say about the monopolization and privatization of space? What concerns does Canada need to have in terms of autonomy and national security when we're talking about privatization?

[Jessica West]

I think having a single provider be so essential to a military or national capability is not an example of having redundant and resilient systems. Canada is addressing this in part. We have good manufacturing and have our own dedicated communications and earth observation systems. We're also developing a dedicated launch capability, so I think there is an emergence of existing capabilities.

One challenge with the commercialization of space and the increasing reliance on commercial actors for military capabilities is that it can put civilian users at risk. Not differentiating between the civilian and commercial side and military systems means that if there is conflict, they're all mixed up and they can be targeted. We see this in the context of Ukraine, where commercial capabilities that are involved in the conflict are themselves targets of jamming and cyber-interference in particular. Putting thought towards the implications of the mixing of users and capabilities, particularly as space itself becomes more of a target of war fighting, is going to be very important because that can drag others into the conflict.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you. We'll have to leave it there.

That completes our first six-minute round, colleagues. We're getting back to the same old problem of 25 minutes' worth of questions in a little more than 20 minutes. I'd like to do a full round. In the event that there's a motion to be put forward, I ask the colleague who might be putting it forward to wait until we complete the full round because we control our time afterwards.

With that, I'll turn to Mrs. Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Commercial companies now have satellites that detect electronic signals emitted by ships with their transponders turned off and have GPS jammers. How do you see the defence relationships changing between commercially acquired military intelligence and the military itself?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I don't see it changing because what we aren't aware of is the deep relationships that have long existed. To give you an example, during the 1991 Gulf War, which is considered the first space war, 80% to 85% of space capabilities came from the commercial sector. In addition, at the time, the United States went to all the commercial surveillance-from-space companies and bought up all their data so the Iraqis couldn't get it.

Elon Musk is in the news, but what we don't know, because it's highly classified, is that.... Because space asset satellites are nationally flagged under the registration convention or as an add-on to the outer space treaty, the government, as it does with defence export controls, places certain restrictions on these states. Because the state is a significant user, or a commercial client, if you will, it has significant leverage over what commercial satellites are and are not able to do and, in most cases, who they are able to sell to and who, under export control regulations, they will not be allowed to sell to or access. This is already fairly well established. The details, of course, we don't hear about, partially for intellectual property reasons and other commercial reasons.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Then you're not aware of any black market for intel from satellites. That does not exist. I mean a commercial vendor is selling it to a nation that would not otherwise be allowed to receive the information.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I don't know of any. One can speculate that probably on the margins there are, but as with defence export controls, to violate national law is extremely dangerous in the margins of commercial space. Basically, for the major space companies at least, until you get more and bigger private players from other countries in this game, the costs of being caught and what will happen to you are much too high, including for Elon Musk, so I'm not greatly concerned about it.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

There's going to be a significant gap in satellite-based awareness through NORAD because our RADARSAT satellites will outlive their useful lifespans—they'll outrun them—before they can be replaced. Is there any opportunity for existing commercial satellites to have a dual use so that we can gain eyes on the Arctic where that gap is going to be created?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I'm not an expert on this, but I don't think so.

First of all, RADARSAT is not a NORAD-supporting asset at all. Part of the reason is that the delay between taking radar pictures and when you can see them is, I think, a one-day or two-day delay, and that's not very useful militarily. Advanced RADARSAT technology, which is supposedly the defence-enhanced system, will shrink that down, but it will be dedicated to the military. The civilian commercial side is probably not going to get access to any of that information.

I don't think, in my view, this is a significant issue per se. It's a problem, but I can't see how in the current climate.... Again, we can't control how the Russians, the Chinese and the Indians do a deal with their companies, although we know that the Chinese and the Russians are hand in glove, if you will, with their industries, which is always a problem for us. We're less transparent about it.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Did you say that NavCan is the controller of the satellites that are deemed for military use?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

If you want RADARSAT.... I'll give you a better example. Sapphire, the only military-dedicated satellite we have, is controlled for the military, but it is flown by MDA Space. We have no experience in flight except for military personnel who get seconded to the American space system.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, you have about six seconds.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Militarily speaking, how does the successful landing of China's unmanned rocket on the far side of the moon impact us defence-wise?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Now you no longer have six seconds. You'll have to work that back in with some other answer.

Mr. Collins, you have five minutes.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to our witnesses.

Dr. West, I'll start with you. Other witnesses at committee have talked about a wild west scenario in space such that there's a lot of activity without structured international agreements. You talked about pursuing the development of norms, and Dr. Fergusson just talked about the relationship between China, Russia and India. You referenced that Russia doesn't share a lot of information publicly.

What's on your mind as it relates to a blueprint for developing those norms when we have fractured relationships and communication channels specifically with Russia, China and India?

[Jessica West]

I disagree that outer space is a wild west. I think it's one of those throwaway lines that people use to indicate that we have a lot of work to do on governance. We do have treaties and rules in place, and we have core principles, and I think those are fundamental to build on.

How to build the norms of responsible behaviour is challenging. Diplomatically, there's a significant rift within the United Nations not just on this issue but on almost all issues, so we're in a moment where we have to continue to put the ground pieces in place, or the building blocks. Holding the discussions and talking about what the priorities and perceived threats are is very important. There's a lot of work happening at the United Nations that is fundamental to this effort. Even if we don't have a formal agreement in place within the next year or so, it's shaping how countries think about outer space.

I think, though, what's really important for norms is that fundamentally they're about what we do, not what we put on paper. That's why I don't see it as nothing that, for example, Canada immediately joined the anti-satellite moratorium even though we might not have an intention of conducting such activities. Norms require walking the walk and talking the talk, demonstrating through your own actions what you expect others to do.

There's a lot of scope for developing what is normal when it comes to what I like to call uncomfortable military activities. In terms of the creeping of satellites close to other satellites, countries have an opportunity to engage in practices that would mitigate the risk of that behaviour, such as issuing prior notifications; foregoing stealth capabilities; setting, through their own behaviour, certain thresholds for safety when it comes to distance from other satellites; and speaking about the fact that they're doing that and see it as something responsible states do. We can speak with our actions at moments when we can't necessarily have great breakthroughs diplomatically at the United Nations.

Fundamentally, it's important to constantly reinforce the outer space treaty. It is not outdated; it is more relevant than ever. It is a collection of high-level principles that include not putting nuclear weapons in outer space. This is why so many meetings and discussions are happening right now, both formally and behind the scenes, related to potential nuclear threats in space. Diplomacy is the only way that is going to be prevented and dealt with. There is nothing you can do to defeat a nuclear weapon in space and to protect yourself in outer space; it's a space killer. Reinforcing key principles is absolutely important, and that's happening not just at the UN but also bilaterally with a lot of states. The United States is engaging heavily with India and China in particular to lean on Russia over some of these fears.

I would reiterate that it's about doing what you want other states to do and making clear that's what you're doing and why you're doing it, while continuing to engage and put the building blocks of future agreements in place at the United Nations so that when the political opportunity arises, those can move forward.