Evidence of meeting #107 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was capabilities.
A recording is available from Parliament.
11:45 a.m.
Liberal
Chad Collins Liberal Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON
Thanks, Dr. West.
Dr. Fergusson, I'll ask you the same question. Even with those structured agreements, you referenced in your opening the cheating that occurs in outer space. Can you comment on that?
11:45 a.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I agree with a lot of what Dr. West said, but there's a real problem: If wishes were horses, peasants would ride. That's an old saying my wife always uses.
If you go back to the origins of the outer space treaty, it was a bilateral deal that ended up in the UN, and everyone happily signed on when only the United States and the Soviet Union were actors in space. It was a deal over issues about transiting over, for intelligence reasons, both countries. The lesson of all that and the lesson of these arms control agreements—such as the 2002 notification agreement between the United States and Russia, which is basically defunct now—is that unless you have the great powers on board, you're going nowhere.
China, Russia—I'm not sure about India—and even the United States are really not interested in codifying. For the Americans, the fundamental reason is that, through their experience during the heyday of arms control in the 1970s and 1980s, they kept finding the Russians were cheating all the time. They have no reliance, and the United States, despite what many people think, is a country guided by the rule of law. The fear of the Americans is that if we have deep international regulations, we will be handicapped and handcuffed, but our adversaries will not be handcuffed.
If I could quickly add one thing, don't misunderstand that there are probably a series of tacit agreements between the major space players on go and no-go behaviours and zones.
11:45 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Mr. Collins.
Madame Normandin, you have two and a half minutes.
June 3rd, 2024 / 11:45 a.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much.
My question is for Dr. Fergusson.
In February, you took part in a podcast along with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute where there was a discussion on the American space agency. During that discussion, someone—I don't know whether it was you—said the following:
...this is with space technology and we all know what's going on in space, mass and commercial investment, smaller and smaller satellites, more and more junk in space. There are a lot of issues that are going to play out. And that's one of the issues where, again, the space question, we're not really in a full alignment with the United States at all.
I'd like to hear your opinion on the National Space Council. Since its creation, are we now slightly more aligned with the United States? Are there any areas where we still differ? If so, are they military or commercial?
I'd like to know more about how aligned we are with the United States.
11:45 a.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
That's a really important question and a really good question. I think I said those things, but I don't remember. I'm getting old.
Our commercial entities, our aerospace industry and our space industry are closely aligned with those in the United States. They survive because of their access to the American space industry, the close links between companies and the integration of our economies. It's a simple reality. The government, however, is not very closely aligned with the U.S. on the issue of space. There have been numerous examples. My colleague hinted at and raised them. If you have Canada leading a NATO study on the defence of space, you have a problem, because the key actor here is the United States. They see things about space very differently from us.
It would certainly be nice if Canada had a space policy, a space strategy and a real, coherent approach to space, which we do not have and have never had. The key thing here, in my view, is that the Canadian strategy is to do little bilateral things with elements of the U.S. Space Force and the Space Command right now—that's all we've done—to keep us insulated from the other, bigger issues that the Americans are talking about.
I'll give you an example. There's a large faction in the United States that says the outer space treaty is problematic because it doesn't define what an orbit is. We don't even know. There's no legal definition of where space starts, and that's fine with them. It gives them the leeway to do what they want.
The danger of what you're talking about is that we have a tendency, because of what I would call a knee-jerk response from Canada about our relations with the United States, to try to always show that we're co-operating at an arm's-length distance, particularly for domestic and international political reasons.
11:50 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Ms. Normandin.
Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.
11:50 a.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you.
Further to the conversation on the idea that no one wins on the nuclear path, no one wins as it's a complete obliteration. I often think that, ultimately, there is only one winner in this, and it is the companies that built weapons in the first place.
Ms. West, could you comment on that? Also, there have been a lot of conversations about the national space council, and I have concerns about that. Is a smaller conversation far better than a NATO-led conversation or a UN-led conversation? Are there more controls in terms of commercialization, or is there more influence of commercialization on those smaller conversations?
11:50 a.m.
Senior Researcher, Project Ploughshares
I'll begin with the space council. I'm still waiting to see how it functions and what it does. I wasn't privy to the earlier conversations. My understanding is that a lot of it is focused on having one place to have a conversation in Canada, because space cuts across so many different ministerial responsibilities and departments. I think that's valuable; we need that visibility. We need to think whole of government on space, as this conversation is showing.
On nuclear and no one wins, I would absolutely agree. I'm not sure how realistic the nuclear threat will be, or if it will be one of those deterrent capabilities in the background the way we see on earth. However, the threat is always there.
I want to point out that Canada has a lot of military co-operation with the United States in space. We're one of a handful of countries that are part of CSpOC, the Combined Space Operations Center, with the United States. We are also a participant in Operation Olympic Defender, which is specifically focused on this question of defence of objects and satellites in outer space.
I think maybe we've shifted over the years toward closer military co-operation on space issues than we used to. Again, I think being part of these conversations is important, because it gives Canada a voice and leverage. We have to exercise that voice and lead with our capabilities and actions in the multiple different fora where these conversations are happening.
I think NATO is an important place to be talking about this. Because of the current geopolitical climate in which we find ourselves, that grouping of states is influential. I'm not sure it matters who's leading the deterrence study. It's more of a political thing. However, NATO has declared outer space a military domain. That has raised a lot of questions, so this is about what they mean.
11:50 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Unfortunately, we'll have to leave the answer there.
Next, for five minutes, we'll have some combination of Allison and Bezan.
11:50 a.m.
Conservative
Dean Allison Conservative Niagara West, ON
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
To both our witnesses, thank you very much for being here.
We talked about Canada's limited ability to make a difference. Where should Canada contribute with the international partners, probably more specifically with the U.S., given the fact that we're really not a player at the table? Where should we be spending our money or focusing? Where would we get the biggest bang for the buck?
11:50 a.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Right now, the biggest bang for the buck would be the defence enhanced surveillance from space RADARSAT capability. If you go back 30 years, while we were developing RADARSAT, the United States was investing a lot of money in trying to develop it as well. They failed and Congress cancelled it. The United States, as far as I understand, thinks this is a fantastic capability if it's developed and brought into a real-time capability not just for North American defence operations but also for operations on a global basis.
The key thing, if there's a strategy in Canada—and it's really embedded in the military, not in the government—is this: What small number of key assets can we provide that can open the door to greater information and knowledge from the U.S. on its leading space capabilities as the leading space power? That's how you do it.
As Dr. West pointed out, if you look at our relationship with the United States and go back in time to when we were doing basically nothing, I can tell you that the U.S. Space Command, as it was known back then, basically kicked us out the door in a variety of different ways. As we started to contribute significant capabilities.... Sapphire is significant, but it's a one-off. A constellation of Sapphire would be a major contribution. That's how the doors open. That's how we get more influence and more access instead of the U.S. filtering everything out from us.
11:55 a.m.
Conservative
11:55 a.m.
Conservative
11:55 a.m.
Conservative
Pat Kelly Conservative Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB
Great.
Dr. Fergusson, in response to a previous question, you said there were tacit “go and no-go” agreements on behaviours between the great powers. Can you list what some of those are that you believe are tacitly agreed to?
11:55 a.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
The first and perhaps most important one is geosynchronous orbit, particularly the DSP. The Russians and the Chinese have both developed a similar global capability. The extent to which it gives you full coverage, I don't know.
In the case of the DSP, if anyone attempted to strike it, that would automatically be interpreted as a preliminary to a strategic nuclear strike on earth: We're going to blind our opponent, and then we're going to launch. That becomes extremely dangerous.
Of course, it's classified; no one's going to tell you, because if we made a quiet deal with the Russians, and even with the Chinese today, and it went public, it would be a major embarrassment for the government given the policies particularly in the United States, but in Canada as well. That seems to be a logical tacit agreement.
Remember, it's not about war in space; it's about the nature of terrestrial warfare and the outcomes and fears of terrestrial warfare, which will drive actors to strike at space. We're not going to have a war just in space. That makes no sense at all.
11:55 a.m.
Conservative
Pat Kelly Conservative Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB
Okay, thanks. I'm running out of time.
I have one more question.
Mrs. Gallant asked a question in her final few seconds, and I wonder if maybe you could address it. She talked about China's landing on the far side of the moon. Is the appearance of a stake in the ground just a demonstration of capability? Is there military significance? Are there mineral extraction implications? What do we make of this?
11:55 a.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Fundamentally, it's a demonstration of equality: “We are the People's Republic of China. We can do what the United States can do. In fact, now we're ahead of them.” It's about prestige and humiliating us. If you go back to the space race between the Soviet Union and the United States, a lot of that was simply a race to the moon for reasons of prestige.
11:55 a.m.
Conservative
Pat Kelly Conservative Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB
It's an exhibition of hubris more than anything else.
11:55 a.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Yes.
11:55 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Not that hubris ever happens around here.
Ms. Lapointe, you have five minutes.
11:55 a.m.
Liberal
Viviane LaPointe Liberal Sudbury, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'll be sharing my time this morning with my colleague MP Fillmore.
Dr. West, in your opening comments you talked about how the uncertainty around space defence brings with it an increase in a number of potential risks. Can you expand on those risks and on what we can do to manage or mitigate them?
11:55 a.m.
Senior Researcher, Project Ploughshares
There are a lot of activities in outer space that are ambiguous. We don't have tacit agreements on some of the more important ones that are happening, such as satellites that get up close and inspect, image or creep up. We're not really sure what other capabilities they have. Do they have eavesdropping capabilities? Do they have a jammer? Could they have a laser capability? Not knowing causes escalatory responses. The noise we're hearing from the United States on this suggests there are no tacit agreements on safe distances and on how to engage in these practices.
I think the way to mitigate this is to start having better transparency practices that can make some military activities safer, such as, for instance, if you're trying to inspect another satellite, giving prior notification so that you don't have an accident and the other operator doesn't respond in a way that increases the likelihood of an accident. Again, things are moving very quickly, and if you have uncoordinated, close-proximity activities in space, you can easily collide. You can also have misperceptions about certain sensitive capabilities. I think other states understand which satellites are particularly essential to defence. Professor Fergusson mentioned the DSP.
Early warning capabilities are a great example, so you don't get up close and personal with some of those really sensitive capabilities when the reaction might be quite drastic on earth. There's a lot we can do. It will take time, in particular because some of these are new capabilities. How they work in practice takes time to sort out.
Noon
Liberal
Viviane LaPointe Liberal Sudbury, ON
Dr. Fergusson, Dr. West said, “good defence requires good governance”. I'd be curious to hear what you think good governance is.
Noon
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I'm not sure how to answer that, to be honest with you. Good governance is a function of consistency in government policy and in behaviour. We might not like what they're doing, but as long as they're consistent, that to me is good governance.
In the context of the international system—or the international community, as we misleadingly call it—the problem is the tendency to think that somehow it's like a parliament. It's not a parliament. It's a collection of sovereign states, and it has always been a collection of sovereign states. States will do what is in their interests. They will defect when they have to. They'll adhere and use that for political reasons when they have to.
I'm not concerned about good governance, only in the sense that in Canada for space we don't have governance, or at least we don't have good governance. The national council is not new. It's not going to go very far, I'm pretty sure, because it has no authority. Until some meat is put on its bones to really coordinate national space policy, it's simply taking the old interdepartmental space committee, giving it a label and saying, “Look, we're doing something again.”